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Introduction
[A]s slavery was once a way of life and now ... has become obsolete and
incomprehensible, so the practice of bribery in the central form of the
exchange of payment for official actions will become obsolete. -John T. Noo-
nan, Jr.I
Throughout history, corruption has flourished despite efforts to eliminate
it. 2 Recent reports of corrupt activities show that corruption affects all
types of nations, from industrialized, to poor, to transitional. 3 Today's
global society is no exception. Newspapers and magazines across the
world detail the exploitation of nations by their own leaders.4 The current
1. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBEs 706 (1984).
2. See id.
3. See, e.g., John Rossant, Dirty Money, Bus. WK., Dec. 18, 1995, at 5. Nations
shocked by corruption scandals include: Italy, France, Japan, South Korea, India, Mex-
ico, Colombia, Brazil, South Africa. No region of the world has been immune. See also
Patrick Glynn et al., The Globalization of Corruption, in CoRRuPTION AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 7 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997); Nancy Zucker Boswell, An Emerging Con-
sensus on Controlling Corruption, 18 U. PA. J. IN'r'L ECON. L. 1165, 1167 (1997).
4. The corruption revolution began in the early nineties with the overthrow of the
corrupt Italian government which received dubious payments from Mani Puliti: "The
considerable losses around the scandal-ridden Banesto bank of Spain; the virtually insti-
tutionalized practice of false invoices in France; and an appalling series of malpractice
revealed in Belgium ...." Francois Vincke, How Effective is the Business Community in
Combatting Corruption?, in Smart Marc Weiser, Dealing with Corruption: Effectiveness of
Existing Regimes on Doing Business, 91 Am. Soc'Y INr'L L. PRoc. 99, 102 (1997). The
world could be witnessing a change in the consciousness of the people: they no longer
accept corruption as part of the governmental process. "The end of the Cold War and
the emergence of a truly integrated international economy have also contributed to the
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fate of corruption could mirror that of slavery in the 1850s: it could be
several years of irreversible change leading to the end of an outmoded
practice. 5
The end of the Cold War has led to the consolidation of democracy,
political stability, and respect for the rule of law, as well as effective devel-
opment and the expansion of open, competitive markets.6 Corruption
could undermine these advances.7 Great economic interdependence
defines the world today, and corruption seriously threatens the stability of
the international realm, the creation of democratic regimes, and the emer-
gence of open markets. 8
Not only is corruption a threat to the international economy, but it is
also a threat to the political life of many nations.9 Large-scale corruption is
a violation of human rights. It takes from the people the power to effi-
ciently dispose of their resources and further impoverishes the impover-
ished. 10 Combating corruption requires a multi-pronged solution that
takes into account both the economic and human rights effects of
corruption.
In recent years, such international entities as the International Cham-
ber of Commerce (ICC), Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), and United Nations, have resolved to combat cor-
ruption. They aim their efforts at the supply side of corruption, that is, the
regulation of international businesses. This Note argues that demand side
initiatives to curb international corruption, which would emphasize moni-
toring bribe-takers (i.e. public officials), would bolster supply side initia-
tives, which target bribe-makers (i.e. international businesses). Non-
governmental organizations and international institutions sufficiently
combat the supply side of international corruption. Most countries pro-
hibit public officials from receiving bribes, but are lax in enforcement.
widespread perception of corruption as a problem with inherently global ramifications."
Glynn et al., supra note 3, at 7-9.
5. See Glynn, supra note 3, at 28.
6. See Boswell, supra note 3, at 1166.
7. "In every country on the former front of the Cold War - South Korea, Taiwan,
Mexico, Italy, and even Japan - holding the line against communism was more impor-
tant than instituting real free markets and political competition. Now, shocks are begin-
ning to rock the Establishment of the industrialized nations." Rossant, supra note 3, at
5.
8. In the former Soviet bloc, beleaguered publics could confuse democratization
with the corruption of the economy, which may lead to an authoritarian backlash. See
Glynn et al., supra note 3, at 9-10. Furthermore, even while democracy is becoming
more commonplace, especially in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, it is often weak, and
corrupt leaders and institutions can cause it to fail. See Boswell, supra note 3, at 1167.
9. See NDIVA KOFELE-KALE, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RESPoNSIBILITY FOR ECONOMIC
CRIMEs: HOLDING HEADs OF STATE AND OTHER HIGH RANKING OFFCLALS INDIVIDUALLY LIA-
BLE FOR AcTs OF FRAUDULENT ENRICHMENT 20-24 (1995).
10. See id. at 105-07 (stating that international human rights documents guarantee a
people's fundamental right to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources); see
also Jennifer M. Hartman, Government by Thieves: Revealing the Monster Behind the
Kleptocratic Masks, 24 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & COM. 157, 170 (1997) ("The right of peo-
ples not to be dispossessed of their wealth and natural resources is not just any ordinary
human right, but the fundamental human right, the right that transcends all others").
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Hence, the next logical step is to attack the demand side of corruption at
the international level." International initiatives targeting demand side
corruption should include legal initiatives and policy initiatives. Legal ini-
tiatives should include a new anti-corruption treaty which criminalizes the
most contemptible acts of corruption, 12 and administrative and judicial
international machinery to create an effective avenue for citizens to hold
public officials accountable. 13 Policy initiatives should include employing
international financial institutions to create contractual provisions for bor-
rowing,14 and incorporating Transparency International to rally interna-
tional public opinion and give legitimacy to international initiatives
targeting demand side corruption.' 5 Such policy initiatives reduce the role
of the government in the economy and the discretion public officials have
in granting government contracts. These policy initiatives also allow
nations to lay a domestic foundation upon which effective, international
anti-corruption strategies can be built.
Operating under the assumption that corruption harms the public
good, Part I of this Note discusses the causes and consequences of corrup-
tion, narrowing corruption to its most harmful manifestation: indigenous
11. As international corporations realize the costs of bribery to their businesses,
their self-regulation has increased. Several non-governmental organizations, such as the
ICC, OECD, and United Nations, have pushed efforts to curb the supply side of corrup-
tion. However, there has been little effort to curb demand side corruption at the interna-
tional level, mainly for reasons such as sovereignty and culture. The problem is,
controlling only one side of the corruption equation is not sufficient. The international
community must limit the demand for corrupt payments because demand will create
supply. Further, even though every country has laws against the receipt of bribes by
public officials, enforcement is lax. Therefore, citizens have no way of holding public
officials accountable. This leaves the international realm as the most attractive avenue
for holding public officials accountable. Action in the international realm, however,
should be limited to cases of. systematic corruption, also known as indigenous spolia-
tion. See Hartman, supra note 10.
12. See generally Stephen Muffler, Proposing a Treaty on the Prevention of Interna-
tional Corrupt Payments: Cloning the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is Not the Answer, 1
ILSAJ. INr'L & COMP. L. 4 (1995) (proposing a treaty that combats the supply side of
corruption, but the machinery proposed could also be used to curb demand-side cor-
ruption. Instead of criminalizing bribery, this treaty proposes civil sanctions as a rem-
edy). Criminalization of bribery is a thorny issue. On one hand, a value-based
criminalization will bring about dissent by those countries unwilling to define corrup-
tion based on western values. On the other hand, criminalization suggests moral indig-
nation by the international community and parallels the domestic laws of all nations. If
international criminalization takes into account these local laws and local cultures, it
can be a powerful tool for citizens who want to hold their public officials accountable.
13. See id. at 36 (proposing a three step process to combat worldwide corruption:
First, the establishment of a U.N. Anti-Corruption Committee to work with the ICC's
Standing Committee, the OECD, regional organizations, and TI, in consolidating and
centralizing international efforts. Second, the creation of an Anti-Corruption Commis-
sion as an administrative agency, to investigate claims of corruption. Third, utilization
of the new International Criminal Court for adjudication of the most contemptible
charges of corruption.).
14. See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Corruption - A General Review with an Emphasis on the
Role of the World Bank, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 451, 479-82 (1997).
15. See Boswell, supra note 3, at 1168-69; see also Introducing TI, TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
May 1994, at 1.
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spoliation. Next, Part I analyzes the past and current state of domestic and
international anti-corruption initiatives. Part 11 lays out the legal and pol-
icy initiatives necessary in attaining the appropriate solution to interna-
tional corruption control. The Note concludes that the international
community needs to create international initiatives and machinery to curb
demand side corruption. The international community must give citizens
the opportunity to hold bribe-takers accountable for the damage corrup-
tion causes.
I. The Historical Roots of Corruption and Attempts to Control It
A. The Complexity of Corruption
Before trying to solve the corruption problem, the international community
must first understand the definition of corruption, the causes of corrup-
tion, and the consequences of corruption. Upon attaining this understand-
ing, the international community can properly address the problem of
corruption.
1. Defining Corruption
Corruption is "[tihe act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully
and wrongfully uses his or her station or character to procure some benefit
for himself or herself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights
of others."16 Corruption diverts resources allocated for the public good
into the personal bank accounts of those charged with protecting the pub-
lic good. 17
Indigenous spoliation is recognized as the most harmful manifesta-
tion of corruption. Indigenous spoliation is defined as "an illegal act of
depredation which is committed for private ends by constitutionally
responsible rulers [and] public officials."' 8 In this form, corruption harms
the public good 19 not only through transferral of a nation's wealth to pri-
16. BLACi's LAW DICTIONARY 345 (6th ed. 1990). Most legal scholars treat corrup-
tion as the arbitrary use of discretionary powers for the personal benefit of oneself and
the illegitimate use of public resources. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 455-56.
17. See Robert Klitgaard, Bribes, Tribes and Markets that Fail: Rethinking the Econom-
ics of Underdevelopment, 11 Day. S. AFR. 481, 482 (1994) (stating that corruption "pro-
vides a market price where a market is not allowed"); Daniel Kauffman, Corruption:
Some Myths and Facts, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1997, at 114-31 (defining corruption as
the abuse of public office for personal gain).
18. KOFELE-KALE, supra note 9, at 10 (citing indigenous spoliation as the most devas-
tating manifestation of corruption). A government engaged in indigenous spoliation
would be a kleptocracy, which is "[diefined as a government or state in which those in
power exploit natural resources and steal .... " Hartman, supra note 10, at 157.
19. The consensus of modern commentators is that the long term effects of corrup-
tion negate growth and weaken public institutions. See SusAN RosE-AcKERMAN, CoRRUt-
TON 88 (1978); Pablo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Qj. ECON. 681 (1995)
(representing one of the few empirical studies finding a correlation between corruption
and economic growth in the sense that the less corruption there is, the higher the gross
domestic product growth rate); P. WARD, CORRTInON, DEVELOPMENT AND INEQUALITY 170
(1989) (emphasizing the negative effect of corruption on the income distribution in
developing countries). But see Joseph Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-
Cornell International Law Journal
vate bank accounts, 20 but by also destroying the political legitimacy of the
government. 21
2. The Causes of Corruption
Corruption equals monopoly power plus discretion minus accountabil-
ity.22 Attacking corruption requires targeting and understanding these
three elements of the formula.23
The first cause of corruption, the monopoly power of the public sec-
tor, is the degree to which the government controls and intervenes in the
nation's industries.24 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) traced
much public corruption to government intervention in the economy, 25 not-
ing such examples as: trade restrictions, subsidies, price controls, and low
wages in the civil service.26 Additionally, corruption not only feeds off of
the government's role in the economy, but also the discretion of public
officials within the state's regulatory framework.
This second cause of corruption, the discretion of public officials, is
contingent upon the control the government has over the economy. The
incidence of corruption not only depends upon the scope of public bene-
fits available, but also the discretion officials have in dispensing those ben-
Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 417, 419-22 (1967) (arguing, from the economist's
perspective, that corruption can be useful for a country's economy). As such, this Note
does not discuss the potential efficiencies of corruption, accepting the conventional wis-
dom that corruption harms the public good.
20. A public official accepting bribes disturbs the wealth and resources of the coun-
try which entrusted the officials with power. See generally KOFELE-KALE, supra note 9;
Muffler, supra note 12; Shihata, supra note 14, at 460 (positing that favoritism is perva-
sive in human behavior and that petty bribes can be seen as charity or gratuity).
21. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in CoRRupnON
AND THE GLOBAL ECONoMy 45 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997). Rose-Ackerman also
notes that
Systemic corruption undermines the legitimacy of governments, especially
democracies. Citizens may come to believe that the government is simply for
sale to the highest bidder. Corruption undermines claims that government is
substituting democratic values for decisions based on ability to pay. It can lead
to coups by undemocratic leaders. Military takeovers are frequently justified as
a response to the corruption of democratic rulers.
Id.
22. See Robert Klitgaard, International Cooperation Against Corruption (visited Mar.
3, 1999) <http://www.transparency.de/resources/klitgaard.html>.
23. "In the short run, removal of authoritarian controls, decentralization, privatiza-
tion, and opening of [Eastern European and former Soviet Union] economies to interna-
tional participation have vastly expanded opportunities for corruption; in some places,
such as Russia, it is rampant." Glynn et al., supra note 3, at 10; see also Boswell, supra
note 3, at 1166 (contending that corruption could undermine the dividends gained at
the end of the Cold War, such as consolidation of democracy, effective development,
and open markets).
24. See Glynn et al., supra note 3, at 10.
25. "Where government regulations are pervasive, however, and government offi-
cials have discretion in applying them, individuals are often willing to offer bribes to
officials to circumvent the rules, and, sad to relate, officials are occasionally tempted to
accept these bribes." PAOLO MAURO, WHY WORRY ABOUT CORRUPTION?, 4 (1997).
26. See id. at 5.
Vol. 33
2000 A Strategy to Combat Corruption
efits.27 When states operate particular enterprises in lieu of private sector
management, corrupt public officials have the ability to cause losses within
the industry, especially when they are not held accountable. 28
The third cause of corruption, the lack of accountability of public offi-
cials, coincides with the discretionary power of public officials. If public
officials are able to use their discretion without threat of repercussion, then
unchecked corruption could ensue.29 Lack of accountability corresponds
with lack of market transparency, 30 which permits inefficient practices to
continue undetected.31 Where public officials with monopoly power over
discretionary decisions are not held accountable, they have the incentive to
be corrupt.
3. The Consequences of Corruption
The IMF notes several consequences of corruption: (1) corruption lowers
investment and retards economic growth; (2) corruption misallocates tal-
ent; (3) corruption reduces the effectiveness of aid flows; (4) corruption
leads to adverse budgetary consequences; (5) corruption lowers the quality
of the infrastructure and of public services; and (6) corruption distorts the
composition of government expenditure. 32 Besides these direct effects of
corruption, there are indirect effects. Not only will the rate of return of
new investment be lowered, but the rate of return for existing and past
investment will also suffer.33 In the end, public officials commence new,
corrupt projects as the infrastructure deteriorates. 34
27. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21, at 44.
28. See Kenneth U. Surjadinata, Revisiting Corrupt Practices From a Market Perspec-
tive, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1021, 1082-83 (1998) (arguing that the more states become
involved in the marketplace, the greater the likelihood that capital markets will relocate
funds elsewhere); Glynn et al., supra note 3, at 11; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21, at 36
(citing examples of corruption in the privatization arena: privatizations in Argentina
favored those with inside information and connections; privatizations in Thailand
involved kickbacks and commission fees; and, some privatizations in the former eastern
bloc involved similar corrupt transfers).
29. "if the likelihood of detection and punishment is high, either the supply or the
demand for bribes may fall to zero... The expected cost of bribery is the probability of
being caught times the probability of being convicted times the punishment levied."
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21, at 40.
30. Greater transparency allows all internal activities of a country to be viewed with-
out obstacles. "States can reduce inefficient practices by increasing the visibility of how
rules govern transactions between parties." Surjadinata, supra note 28, at 1081.
31. See Bribonomics, ECONoMIsr, Mar. 19, 1994, at 86; Klitgaard, supra note 22.
32. See MAuRo, supra note 25, at 6-7.
33. "Moreover, higher spending on capital projects will reduce the resources avail-
able for other spending." VITO TAu'zi & HAmID DAvoODI, RoADs TO NowmHaE: How COR-
RUPTION IN PUBLIC INVEsTMENT HURTS GRowm 6 (1998); see also KoFEL-KALE, supra note
9, at 15 (arguing that corruption does not have a socially beneficial side when wealth
moves out of the country and into the bank accounts of public officials).
34. See TA~zi & DAvooD, supra note 33, at 10; Beverley Earle, The United States'
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral
Suasion Won't Work, Try the Money Argument, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 207, 222 (1996) (not-
ing that not only is the cumulative burden on private agents great, but there is also great
distortion within the international market due to the secrecy of corruption. The shifting
of resources from high quality projects, such as clean water, to other projects deterio-
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Corruption undermines growth and impedes development in the long
run, creates political instability, and exacerbates inequalities.35 Corrup-
tion undermines growth by allowing private interests to determine eco-
nomic policy rather than the rule of law.36 Thus, instead of an increase in
the public good, the personal accounts of corrupt officials increase. 37 This
indigenous spoliation destabilizes emerging markets and limits the ability
of a nation to build economies that can compete within the global mar-
ket.38 High levels of corruption preclude high growth of a nation's gross
domestic product.39 Any gains from corruption are short-term, whereas
the negative effects of corruption are long-term. 40 Most importantly, the
expanding scope of corruption increases the periods of transition to a mar-
ket economy and an open political system.41
Similarly, open political systems cannot merely introduce liberalized
institutions and market economies into a country. Transitional democra-
cies need to balance the existence of diverse political forces.42 "Corruption
rates global quality of life. Corruption stagnates economies by discouraging innovation
and efficiency and encouraging large projects that produce large pay-offs). "As a grow-
ing number of experts are beginning to recognize, widespread corruption threatens the
very basis of an open, multilateral world economy." Glynn et al., supra note 3, at 13.
35. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21, at 42-44; but see Surjadinata, supra note 28,
(suggesting that ten percent of corrupt practices produce efficient outcomes. Therefore,
anti-corruption initiatives should be based on market discipline rather than cultural val-
ues in order to eliminate the over-inclusion of efficient corruption. A view that answers
cultural critiques of anti-corruption initiatives).
36. See KoF.E-KALE, supra note 9, at 14-15; Shihata, supra note 14, at 460 (positing
that corruption creates a law different from that on the books, an ad hoc rule of law in
which special interests are given priority over the public good).
37. "Illicit funds may be used for consumption by top bureaucrats, may be invested
in legitimate businesses at home or abroad, or may be diverted into illegal businesses.
Payoffs are more likely to be diverted into illegal activities or foreign bank accounts than
other funds because they are already illegal and must be kept secret." Rose-Ackerman,
supra note 21, at 43-44.
38. See MarkJ. Murphy, International Bribery: An Example of an Unfair Trade Prac-
tice?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 385, 391 (1995).
39. "Note that low corruption does not necessarily tie into highest GDP growth, but
high corruption precludes high growth." Earle, supra note 34, at 223 (analyzing the
correlation between corruption and GDP growth).
40. In the working of most economies, the impact of corruption is not less harm-
ful, whether we look at market or non-market economies. While the phenome-
non is complex and the cost may fall on other areas at future times, corruption
can endanger the use of economic choices, increase the costs of transactions,
reduce state revenue, increase public expenditures, penalize law-abiders, and
produce adverse distributional effects .... Its prevalence over time could
threaten macro-economic stability, raise the rate of inflation, and push business
into the informal sector.
Shihata, supra note 14, at 460-61.
41. "The scope and adverse impact of corruption.., tend to increase in the periods
of transition from non-market to a market system, and from a totalitarian to an open
political system." Id. at 461; see also M. Naim, The Corruption Eruption, BROWN J. W.
AFF. 245, 246 (1995) (arguing that the disclosure of corruption in recent years is a sign
that democracy and markets are working).
42. See Michael Johnston, Public Officials, Private Interests, and Sustainable Democ-
racy: When Politics and Corruption Meet, in Co, uvnoN AND THE GLO13AL ECONOMY 68-9
(Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997). Johnston outlines the concept of a sustainable democ-
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often flourishes under one-party politics [due to lack of competi-
tion]... and fragmented corruption can lead to a collapse in political com-
petition; if there is little to gain and much to lose by being in opposition,
politics may take the form of a disorganized scramble for the spoils."43
The spread of corruption undermines public confidence in the govern-
ment's ability to implement policy, weakens democratic systems, and could
lead to a collapse of the public order.44
Likewise, corruption creates societal instability by sowing the seeds of
social and political tensions.45 This in turn threatens the very fabric of
society, and undermines the effectiveness of the state and the legitimacy of
government.46 "A share of the country's wealth is distributed to insiders
and corrupt bidders, contributing to inequalities in wealth."47 Corruption
thus deepens the inequities of society.48
racy which suggests that open political systems must first balance between accessibility
and autonomy of political elites, and second balance between wealth and power:
The first envisions a relationship between state and society in which private
interests have significant political influence but officials can formulate and
carry out policies authoritatively. The second refers to a situation in which both
political and economic paths of advancement and numerous and open enough
to reduce temptations to trade either wealth or power for each other.
Id.
43. Id. at 67.
44. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 460 (corruption "transforms public rules and pro-
cedures based on democratic and meritocratic principles into ad hoc practices based on
willingness and ability to pay or on personal connections and reciprocated favors");
Glynn et al., supra note 3, at 10-11; Earle, supra note 34, at 223 (bribery is anti-demo-
cratic in that, when unchecked, it may destabilize a society and actually encourage a
return to dictatorship as a method of controlling corruption. If capitalism and bribery
are viewed as handmaidens then democracy may be endangered, both economically and
politically); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21, at 45 (noting that in Somalia, autocracy
degenerated to warlordism and that as Suharto's reign came to an end, Indonesia
became a kleptocracy).
45. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21, at 44 (noting that in India and Pakistan, cor-
ruption in irrigation systems means that those at the bottom of the system may obtain
much less water than they need even for subsistence farming, causing the poorest produ-
cers to suffer and starve).
46. See id. at 45; Glynn et al., supra note 3, at 10-11.
47. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21, at 44 (noting further that the government must
make up for high contract prices and for disappointing revenue generated by privatiza-
tions, both of which increase the wealth of elites, by raising taxes or cutting spending,
which directly affects the poor who consume most of their income).
48. See id. at 45 (outlining corruption's consequences as including inefficient gov-
ernment contracting and privatizations which are extremely crucial for transitional
democracies; raising the cost of business to MNCs; inefficient use of corrupt payments
for corruption by top bureaucrats rather than strengthening the infrastructure; inequi-
ties broaden; military takeovers become justified as a response to corrupt democratic
rulers; and growth either slows or comes to a halt).
Corruption is usually a rational response to the incentives faced by many that
do business in countries where government influence is pervasive, where insti-
tutions are weak, and where government officials have a substantial degree of
discretion in awarding access to activities under the control of the state. Fur-
thermore, the longer a given economy or institution has endured corruption, the
more ingrained it becomes and the more difficult it is to address.
Cornell International Law Journal
The causes of corruption derive from the role of the government in the
economy and the discretion and accountability of officials who make key
decisions. Corruption leads to economic distortions, political instability,
and the deepening of societal inequalities. The international community
considers corruption a threat to liberalized markets, open political systems,
and the general welfare of society.49 The threat of corruption to domestic
and international stability has led to national and international anti-cor-
ruption initiatives.
B. Existing Efforts to Combat Corruption
The causes and consequences of corruption point to the legal and policy
initiatives necessary to combat corruption. Almost every country con-
demns the receipt or payment of bribes to a public servant. 50 By focusing
on the person taking the bribe, the bribe-taker, these laws attempt to regu-
late the demand side of corruption. Domestic enforcement of such laws is
lax, however,5 1 allowing the demand side of corruption to flourish.5 2
An example of the demand side of corruption would be:
Company X and company Y are bidding on a dam project in country A.
Official P requires a kickback of one million dollars from company X in
return for awarding the contract to country A. Without the kickback, official
P will grant the contract to company Y. When hundreds of millions of dol-
lars are at stake, company X will pay the bribe for assurance of the
contract.
5 3
Companies will pay public officials to be included as a bidder, to be
included as the only qualified bidder, or to be selected as the winning con-
Paul Holden & Jennifer Sobotka, Corruption: An Economic Perspective, address before
the XIIlth Congress of the International Society of Social Defense, Lecce, Italy, (Nov. 28-
30, 1996).
49. See Glynn et al., supra note 3, at 9-10; Boswell, supra note 3, at 1167.
50. "Nearly every nation has made it a crime to bribe or attempt to bribe its state
officials." Muffler, supra note 12, at 5; see also NooNAN, supra note 1, at 702; Hartman,
supra note 10, at 168.
51. "[U]ncovering evidence of corruption is notoriously difficult because both sides
to the transaction have an interest in keeping it secret." Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21,
at 49 (noting that not only are those reporting corrupt activities putting themselves in
danger, but they are also bearing risks of being disciplined by superiors or attacked by
co-workers, making enforcers less inclined to enforce corruption laws).
52. The International Chamber of Commerce and other domestic trade groups tar-
get the supply side of corruption by requiring codes of conduct and self-regulation
within the domestic and international realm, with possible fines and other penalties for
those companies who pay bribes. The onus of controlling demand side corruption,
though, is put upon domestic enforcement through the processes of the police, adminis-
tration, and judiciary.
Demand side initiatives focus on the bribe-taker or public official. By limiting the
discretion officials have in granting government contracts and increasing incentives to
not accept (or demand) bribes, the demand for bribes will decrease.
53. "In some poorer nations, if a foreign company is prepared to offer large sums of
money to secure a project, the government of the country may have a difficult time
preventing key officials from being tempted." David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions
Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of a New International Legal Consensus, 18 Nw.J.
INr'L L. & Bus. 457, 468-69 (1998).
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tractor.54 Allowing public officials to obtain bribes without punishment
leads to an expansion of the demand side of corruption.5 5
The supply side of corruption has its roots embedded in the tradi-
tional notion that "when in Rome, do as the Romans do."5 6 This thinking
creates a self-fulfilling prophecy, leaving international businesses with the
choice of not bribing and being competitively disadvantaged or bribing
more than other companies.5 7 International businesses often choose the
latter. Countries generally leave the regulation of those making bribes to
the bribe-makers themselves, businesses. The lack of self-regulation by
international businesses and the lack of domestic laws condemning the
making of bribes to foreign public officials allows supply side corruption
to thrive.5 8 Only recently have there been advances upon the traditional
supply side mind-frame. 5 9
The United States and the lesser-developed countries of the world
want to end corruption.60 The industrialized nations, whose multinational
corporations (MNCs) exploit corrupt officials by making bribes to them,
have failed to join the anti-corruption revolution until recently. 61 Further,
54. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21, at 34-38 (noting that firms will pay not only
to gain government benefits, such as contracts, access to credit, good exchange rates,
and subsidies, but also to avoid costs such as taxes, criminal penalties, and delays).
55. See id. (noting that payoffs are common in China where many raw materials are
sold at state subsidized prices. Paraguay's multiple exchange rate system led to corrup-
tion as public officials manipulated the system for bribes. In Argentina, a reinsurance
scheme organized by state officials and insurance middlemen deteriorated into outright
fraud against the state. The going rate for a telephone installation was two hundred
dollars in St. Petersburg in 1992. An Indian newspaper published the list of grease pay-
ments necessary for routine public services).
56. See Earle, supra note 34, at 221-22 (noting that the traditional supply side mind
set must be overcome in order to combat corruption, and many current initiatives are
targeted at changing perceptions).
57. "Foreign business, especially in developing countries, often contributes to the
spread of corruption by assuming that pay-offs and connections are inevitable facts of
doing business." Shihata, supra note 14, at 461. "Transnational companies have either
adopted the practice of making [corrupt] payments or have felt compelled to do so,
because these types of bribes are often offered by their competitors." Hartman, supra
note 10, at 161.
58. See Vincke, supra note 4, at 101.
59. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the International Chamber of Commerce
Rules of Conduct, both introduced to the world in 1977, were the first attempts to elimi-
nate the traditional view of corruption.
60. The United States wants to level the playing field with other industrialized
nations due to its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and the lesser-developed countries
want more efficiency in their government spending. See Glynn et al., supra note 3, at 19;
Boswell, supra note 3, at 1168.
61. Japan, Germany, and several European nations are the most prominent culprits.
One commentator explains that nationalism tended to dominate the European land-
scape where a German company would be bidding against a French company rather
than another German company. Germany would not regulate corrupt companies who
gain a competitive advantage over their French counterparts. See Earle, supra note 34, at
224-26.
A change of heart by Europeans and Japanese in the OECD meetings led to the forma-
tion of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions. OECD Working Papers DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20,
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
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MNCs no longer see corruption as an effective overall strategy in gaining
government contracts. 62 Gradually, corruption is becoming obsolete.
63
Corruption remained unchecked in the international realm until the
1970s, when two bodies took a stand. The U.S. Congress enacted the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to regulate the activities of U.S. compa-
nies abroad.64 The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) produced
the Rules of Conduct to encourage MNCs to adopt corporate codes of con-
duct.6 5 Each has been criticized and amended over the past two decades,
but neither succumbed to the traditional mind-frame that corruption is
simply a part of international business. The durability of the FCPA and the
ICC Rules of Conduct coupled with the explosion of corruption scandals
in western Europe in the 1990s 6 6 have led to the advancement of further
anti-corruption initiatives by international non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs).
Figure 1 characterizes the analysis of current and future anti-corrup-
tion initiatives.6 7 Initiatives can be divided into two categories: interna-
tional and domestic. The initiatives curb corruption either by striking at
the supply side of corruption, the bribe-makers, or the demand side of cor-
ruption, the bribe-takers.
Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997. The Convention entered force on February 15, 1999. See
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery to Enter into Force on 15 February 1999 (visited
Mar. 3, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org/news-and-events/release/nw98-124a.htm>.
62. Many MNCs want to create a middle class that has purchasing power. Corrup-
tion intensifies the inequities of the nation, with the rich growing richer and the poor
growing poorer. See Hartman, supra note 10, at 162-63.
63. Gary Edwards, an international business consultant, noted that "some Asian
nationals are telling us that in many of their markets, [bribery] is not necessary. The
practice is increasingly viewed as unacceptable and destructive to their economies." Bar-
bara Ettore, Why Overseas Bribery Won't Last, 83 MGMT. Rnv. 20, n.4 (1994). "While
[business organizations] are concerned about [corruption's] impact on the volume and
cost of transactions, their major worry is the uncertainty it brings to business dealings
and their inability to predict the outcome of competition when corruption is wide-
spread." Shihata, supra note 14, at 457.
64. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub.L.No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494,
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. (91 Stat.) 1494-1500, 4098-4127.
65. International Chamber of Commerce, Extortion and Bribery in Business Trans-
actions, 131st Sess. (Nov. 29, 1977) [hereinafter Extortion and Bribery in Business
Transactions].
66. See Vincke, supra note 4 (naming the scandals of Italy, Spain, France, and
Belgium).
67. The columns of Figure 1 represent the type of measures aimed at corruption,
divided into two categories: domestic and international initiatives. The rows of Figure 1
represent the corruption which these initiatives target, divided into two categories: sup-
ply side/bribe-maker and demand side/bribe-taker. Initiatives usually either target
international businesses (bribe-makers) or domestic officials (bribe-takers).
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FIGURE 1
International Domestic
Quadrant 1: Quadrant 2:
ICC Rules of Conduct
Supply Side/Bribe- FCPA
Maker OECD Recommendation
U.N. Declaration and
regional initiatives
Quadrant 4: Quadrant 3:
Anti-Corruption Treaty
and Anti-Corruption Domestic laws in most
Demand Side/Bribe- Hierarchy countries
Taker
World Bank,
International Monetary
Fund, and Transparency
International
1. Domestic Initiatives Targeting the Supply Side ofCorruption68
The sole representative of domestic initiatives targeting the supply side of
corruption is the FCPA of the United States. The FCPA targets U.S. MNCs
and curbs corruption through criminalizing bribery by U.S. MNCs
abroad.69 The FCPA regulates MNCs making bribes in other nations. 70
Though amendments in 1988 diluted the capacity of the FCPA to regulate
corrupt conduct, MNCs still ensure that they are FCPA-compliant. Since
1977, the FCPA has stood as the only domestic initiative taken to curb the
supply side of international corruption.
In 1958, Congress enacted a law denying tax deductibility for bribes
paid to foreign officials. 7 1 Almost twenty years later, Congress enacted the
FCPA on the heels of the Watergate scandal which exposed several corrupt
practices by U.S. MNCs abroad.72 The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and Internal Revenue Service attempted to prosecute such infractions,
68. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68, Figure 1, Quadrant 2.
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
70. The extraterritoriality of the FCPA extends only to MNCs, for it does not regulate
the behavior of foreign public officials. See United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th
Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that the FCPA does not criminalize receipt of a bribe by
a foreign official and that foreign officials could not be prosecuted for conspiracy to
violate the FCPA).
71. See Lucinda A. Low et al., The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption: A
Comparison with the United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J. Irr'L L. 243,
255 (1998); Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 162(c) (1994).
72. "The Watergate investigation's exposure of huge secret corporate slush funds,
used to finance bribery of corporate officials, acted as a catalyst for the formation of the
FCPA-" Muffler, supra note 12, at 5; see also Glynn et al., supra note 3, at 17 (reporting
that exposure of Lockheed Corporation's illicit payments of $25 million to Japanese
officials, resulted in the resignation and criminal conviction of Japanese Prime Minister
Kakuei Tanaka.).
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but could find no law on which to base a conviction. 73 Now, the FCPA
criminalizes corrupt payments to foreign officials. The statute, as
amended in 1988, prohibits American individuals or corporations from
paying, offering to pay, or promising to pay, foreign government officials to
influence any official act, induce an act or omission in violation of an offi-
cial's duty, or induce officials to use their influence with the government to
obtain business.74 The FCPA further holds U.S. managers liable for prose-
cution, fines, and even imprisonment if it is proven that they knew of an
illegal act.75
Complaints from U.S. MNCs' led to amendments of the FCPA in
1988.76 The amendments provided for three exceptions: (1) payments to
lower-level officials to secure the performance of routine actions (so-called
"grease payments"); (2) bona fide business expenditures; and (3) if the
action is legal in the host country. 77 Congress amended the mens rea
requirement of the FCPA from "reason to know" to "knowing."78 These
amendments decreased the ability of the Department of Justice and Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission to indict possible FCPA-offenders.
The FCPA is not a low priority for enforcement, though, as the $24.8
million fine paid by Lockheed demonstrates. 79 Many times companies will
plea bargain when being prosecuted under the FCPA. For example, Vitusa
Corporation pled guilty in 1994 to a violation of the FCPA.80 Few FCPA
73. "To remedy this perceived anomaly, the U.S. Congress passed the FCPA on
December 19, 1977." Vincke, supra note 4, at 99-100; see also STEPHEN F. BLACK &
ROGER M. WITTN, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CoRRUPT PRAcTIcEs ACT 2-3 (1997).
74. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2, 78ff (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The FCPA
divides criminal enforcement between the Securities and Exchange Commission and
Department of Justice.
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
76. "The Commerce Department has estimated that during 1994 and 1995 alone,
American firms lost 100 foreign contracts worth $45 billion to overseas rivals as a result
of bribes paid to foreign government officials." JUDAH BEsT & JOHN L. HOWARD, THE
FOREIGN CoRRuPT PRAcncEs ACT: A COMPLIANCE APPROACH 1 (1997). See Gantz, supra
note 53, at 461-62.
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(e); 78dd-2(f) (1988); see also Earle, supra note 34, at 210.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (f)(2)(A)(1), (B). Knowing is defined as
such person is aware that such person is engaging in such conduct, that such
circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially certain to occur; or such
person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result is
substantially certain to occur ... knowledge is established if a person is aware
of a high probability of the existence of such circumstances unless the person
actually believes that such circumstances do not exist.
Id.
79. See Earle, supra note 34, at 211-12 (discussing the Lockheed case where the com-
pany acknowledged wrongdoing in paying an Egyptian legislator and her husband, via
their consulting firm, a fee for assisting Lockheed in securing the sale of three transport
planes. The fine was the maximum provided by law and represented twice the profit to
Lockheed on the sale of its C-130 planes).
80. See id. at 213-15 (discussing the Vitusa case where Vitusa had a contract for milk
powder with the Dominican Republic in which the government delayed making the final
payment on the milk powder. The government notified Vitusa of a "service fee" neces-
sary for an official to use his influence to obtain the balance due on the contract. Vitusa
agreed to pay the fee. Five days after payment, Vitusa discussed the legality of the pay-
ment with a U.S. embassy official who notified Vitusa that this would be an infraction
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cases have gone to trial, and even fewer have gone to judgment. One case
that did end in judgment involved an aerospace executive convicted of vio-
lating the FCPA anti-bribery provisions during dealings with the Niger Air
Force.8 1 Due to this strong enforcement, MNCs usually self-ensure their
FCPA-compliance and plea bargain when they are not.82
Unlike the United States, over the last two decades, the rest of the
industrialized world did not enact legislation resembling the FCPA. In
1996, however, the United Nations (U.N.) declared that all members
should criminalize international bribery and the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recommended the same to
its members. These efforts represented international initiatives targeting
the supply side of corruption.
2. International Initiatives Targeting the Supply Side of Corruption83
There are several major international initiatives targeting the supply side of
corruption. First, the ICC recently renewed its efforts to effectively enforce
its Rules of Conduct by calling for MNCs to develop codes of conduct in
line with the Rules of Conduct.8 4 Second, the OECD recently introduced
its Recommendation Against Bribery in International Business Transac-
tions calling for domestic implementation by national legislatures. 85
Third, the U.N. tried to take action against corruption by calling for mem-
ber nations to enact domestic legislation. 86 Lastly, the Organization of
American States (OAS), Council of Europe (CE), and Pacific Basin Eco-
nomic Council (PBEC) also took regional action.87 All of these initiatives,
outside of the ICC Rules of Conduct, attempt to reduce the supply of bribes
by urging for countries to regulate their own MNCs' dealings abroad.
under the FCPA. Vitusa was placed on probation for two years and fined a total of
$20,000. See United States v. Vitusa Corp., 3 FOREIGN CoRRuPr PRAc. AcT RE. (Business
Laws, Inc.) 699.155-699.175 (1994).
81. See United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991) (the executive was
acquitted on seventeen other counts, but convicted for purchasing of airline tickets for a
friend of an official with an important role in the contract approval process and for
certifying to the Department of Defense that "no gifts or gratuities" had been given).
82. See Earle, supra note 34, at 213-20. This shows the influence the FCPA has on
the international business realm.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68, Figure 1, Quadrant 1.
84. See Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, supra note 65; Vincke, supra
note 4, at 103-105 (Vincke, General Counsel of Petrofina, the Belgian oil company, is the
chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on Extortion and Bribery in International Business
Transactions within the ICC).
85. OECD Document C(97)123/FINAL, May 29, 1997, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 1016.
86. See G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in Inter-
national Commercial Transactions, December 16, 1996, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 1043.
87. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 471-72 (the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption and the Protocol on Corruption to the EC Convention on the Protection of
the Communities' Financial Interests, both prepared in 1996, target both demand side
and supply side corruption by calling for the criminalization of corruption which
involves public officials of the Member States).
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a. The ICC Rules of Conduct
The ICC targeted MNCs as a response to the same scandals that prompted
Congress to enact the FCPA.8 8 As early as 1975, the ICC created an inter-
national committee to establish rules on bribery and extortion in interna-
tional commercial transactions. 8 9 In 1977, the ICC became the first NGO
to produce guidelines for multinational corporate conduct.90
The international committee, named the Shawcross 91 Committee, had
four main tasks: (1) periodic review of matters relating to the Rules of
Conduct; (2) interpretation, clarification, and possible suggestions for
modification to the Rules of Conduct; (3) periodic reports to the Council of
the ICC on its activities; and (4) the consideration of alleged infringements
of the Rules of Conduct.9 2 The Shawcross Committee created the Interna-
tional Panel on Extortion and Bribery and Business Transaction (the
"Panel") which could only examine infringements when the adverse party
explicitly consented. 93
The Panel never became effective, however, and the Rules of Conduct
were never formally enforced.94 "The problem with the Panel was that its
competence was based on self-regulation, but its intervention was still
viewed as 'external."' 95 This does not mean the Rules of Conduct failed.
88. See Glynn et al., supra note 69 (naming the Watergate investigation and Lock-
heed scandals as catalysts for change); Vincke, supra note 4, at 99-100 (explaining that
the Watergate investigation led to further discoveries of the widespread practice of pay-
ment of large sums to foreign government officials).
89. See Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, supra note 65.
90. See Vincke, supra note 4, at 99-100 (the ICC, the world business organization
headquartered in Paris, was swift to react and was the first non-governmental organiza-
tion to produce rules of conduct pertaining to bribery and other corrupt activities).
91. See Fritz F. Heimann, Combatting International Corruption: The Role of the Busi-
ness Community, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 150 (Kimberly Ann Elliott
ed., 1997) (the committee was named after its chairman, Lord Shawcross, a former attor-
ney general of Great Britain and Nfirnberg prosecutor).
92. Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, supra note 65, Article 11.
93. Bylaws adopted by the 132d Session of the Council of the ICC, June 20, 1978,
and incorporated as Part IV of the ICC, Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions,
131st Sess. (Nov. 29, 1977). See id. art. 5 (providing that the Panel may, upon the
request of any member or national committee of the ICC or any entity with a legitimate
interest, examine any alleged infringement of the Rules of Conduct by any party, includ-
ing non-members of the ICC and any public authority or official thereof. So, the ICC
combined supply-side and demand-side initiatives, though in reality, no public authority
would ever consent to examination).
94. See Vincke, supra note 4, at 100-01 (even though the Rules were generally well
received, there may have been legal problems with the effectiveness of opinions delivered
by the Panel).
95. Id. at 101 (discussing the difference between a self-regulatory system, where cor-
porations have a complete set of internal rules embodied in codes of conduct, and ajudiciary approach, which relies upon external rules imposed by the community and
sanctioned by the judiciary. The Shawcross committee based the Panel upon notions of
self-regulation, but the business community saw it as a quasi-judicial body and never
integrated it into the life of the business community).
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Instead, many MNCs began to self-regulate, and created codes of conduct
that referred to the Rules of Conduct.9 6
The scandals during the 1990s led to a renewed effort within the ICC
to review the 1977 ICC Report. 97 In 1994, the Executive Board met and
decided to focus its efforts on extortion and bribery and directed the ICC
Secretary General to establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Extortion and
Bribery in International Business Transactions ("Ad Hoc Committee"). 98
The Ad Hoc Committee achieved three things after its formation.
First, it produced recommendations to governments and international
organizations to consolidate anti-corruption initiatives and work towards
domestic implementation of the OECD Recommendation. 9 9 Second, it
revised the Rules of Conduct to expand the definition of bribery, created
independent procedures for financial auditing to ensure greater trans-
parency, and mandated that companies establish their own codes of con-
duct.10 0 Third, the Ad Hoc Committee developed an ICC follow-up
program which set up a Standing Committee in place of the defunct
Panel.1 01
The ICC inhibits supply side corruption by compelling the business
community to self-regulate through corporate codes of conduct and estab-
lishing a Standing Committee to follow-up on corporate self-regulation.
The supply side initiatives of the ICC promise that the ICC will cultivate
anti-corruption initiatives for many years to come and that the obsoles-
cence of corruption may be realized in the near future. 10 2
96. See id. at 100-01 (positing that the Rules of Conduct changed the mentality in
the international business community, and many corporations welcomed self-regula-
tion. They would not, however, submit cases to a quasi-judicial body, constituted within
an international business organization. They opted for self-regulation over a judicial
approach, maintaining a modicum of control in their internal affairs).
97. See Heimann, supra note 91, at 151; Vincke, supra note 4 (naming the scandals
of Italy, Spain, France, and Belgium).
98. See Vincke, supra note 4, at 102; Boswell, supra note 3, at 1173-75.
99. See Vincke, supra note 4, at 103-04; Boswell, supra note 3, at 1174 (stating that
the Ad Hoc Committee endorsed OECD actions and the strong positions taken by the
heads of the World Bank and IMF; furthermore, the Ad Hoc Committee called for more
"transparent government procurement procedures, including disclosure of agents' com-
missions and requiring antibribery certifications by bidders).
100. See Vincke, supra note 4, at 104.
101. See id. at 105. The Standing Committee has eight primary tasks:
(1) promote the Rules through the national committees of the ICC; (2) collect
company codes and serve as a clearinghouse for companies seeking to develop
their own codes; (3) sponsor seminars to stimulate interest in the Rules within
the business community; (4) encourage national governments to include the
business community in actions aiming at strengthening legislation against cor-
ruption; (5) serve as liaison with the OECD and other international organiza-
tions to provide the ICC viewpoint on anti-corruption action; (6) conduct a
study to minimize exposure to extortion or bribery by personnel dealing with
sensitive issues; (7) issue a report at least every two years to the ICC Board and
Council; and (8) assess the Rules in the light of experience and recommend
amendments.
Id.
102. See Heimann, supra note 91, at 147-61.
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b. The OECD Recommendation
The scandals of the 1990s afforded the opportunity for other NGOs to
become active in the anti-corruption arena.10 3 The OECD l0 4 committed
itself to the creation and support of market economies.1 0 5 This commit-
ment and the scandals of the 1990s motivated the OECD to make an anti-
bribery recommendation to its members in 1994.106
The 1994 OECD Recommendation encouraged member countries to
criminalize the payment of bribes of foreign officials. 10 7 It sought extrater-
ritorial application of bribery law much like the FCPA.10 8 The United
States made a strong push to make the recommendation legally binding,
but Japan and many European nations banded together against the United
States.10 9 The 1994 OECD Recommendation created working groups to
address the issues of criminalization, tax deductibility, procurement, and
accounting practices, and set deadlines for further recommendations." 0
In 1996, the OECD made a second recommendation that narrowed the
1994 Recommendation. The 1996 OECD Recommendation confined itself
to the prohibition of tax deductibility of bribes to foreign officials, thus
attacking the supply side of corruption by reducing the incentives to make
corrupt payments.1 ' This small step led to a breakthrough in 1997.
In 1997, the OECD ministers agreed to negotiate a convention to make
payment of bribes to public officials a crime in all twenty-nine OECD
member-nations.11 2 The member nations reached agreement on the com-
103. See Vincke, supra note 4 (naming the scandals of Italy, Spain, France, and
Belgium); Earle, supra note 34, at 226 ("recent events reflected in the headline 'Europe in
the Grip of Corruption Plague' suggest a continent confronting the economic conse-
quences of bribery").
104. The industrialized nations founded the OECD to rebuild Europe after World
War II and expanded in 1961 to become a forum for coordinating assistance to develop-
ing countries. The OECD maintains a membership of twenty-nine countries, thus, its
geographic scope is limited. The membership includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ice-
land, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and
United States. Many industrialized nations are among these twenty-nine countries, so
the degree of influence of the OECD remains great.
105. See Earle, supra note 34, at 225; OECD, U.S. Dep't of State Dispatch, Vol. 5 (No.
25), June 20, 1994.
106. See OECD Council Recommendation C(94)75/FNAL on Bribery in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, May 27, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1389 (1994).
107. See Earle, supra note 34, at 225.
108. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 470.
109. See Earle, supra note 34, at 225 ("Japan, with the backing of its European col-
leagues, objected to U.S. efforts to make the recommendation legally binding"); Muffler,
supra note 12, at 15 (claiming that an anti-corruption convention based on the FCPA's
criminalization will be "stigmatized as American 'moral imperialism'").
110. See Earle, supra note 34, at 226; Boswell, supra note 3, at 1169.
111. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 470; OECD Council Recommendation C(96)27/
FINAL on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials, Apr. 11, 1996,
reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 1311 (1996).
112. See Boswell, supra note 3, at 1169; OECD Revised Recommendation C(97)123/
FINAL, on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, May 23, 1997,
reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 1016 (1997). See also supra note 105.
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mon elements of the crime, resolving a protracted impasse between some
European nations. x 13 The 1997 Recommendation also included best prac-
tices for accounting, auditing, and procurement. 114
By monitoring the contracting procedures of international businesses,
the OECD constrained supply side corruption in the international realm.
The new convention, which came into force on February 15, 1999,
promises to be a strong initiative targeting the supply side of corruption by
criminalizing the payment of bribes by MNCs. 1" 5
c. The U.N. Declaration and Regional Initiatives
The U.S. Congress and ICC were not the only bodies that took action
against corruption in the 1970s. The U.N. Commission on Transnational
Corporations completed a draft International Agreement on Illicit Pay-
ments. 116 Not until 1995, amidst the scandals of western Europe, 117 did
the United Nations resolve to reconvene work on this draft agreement. 18
The renewed efforts in the United Nations parallel the activity in regional
institutions such as the OAS, Council of Europe, and PBEC, creating over-
lapping initiatives targeting the supply side of corruption.
In December of 1996, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a Declara-
tion Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transac-
tions.'1 9 The Declaration called for states to criminalize payment of bribes
113. See Boswell, supra note 3, at 1170 (explaining the protracted impasse between
those who favored a treaty, the French and Germans, and those who favored direct
implementation through national legislation, the United States and most other member
nations); Muffler, supra note 12, at 13-14 (explaining that 18 months of negotiations
occurred due to the threat of U.S. extraterritorial expansion of the FCPA, causing Brit-
ain, Japan, Germany, and France to refuse to allow a binding criminal agreement).
114. See OECD Revised Recommendation, supra note 112.
115. See OECD Working Papers, supra note 61; Steps Taken and Planned Future Actions
by each Participating Country to Ratify and Implement the Convention on Combating Brib-
ery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, <http://
www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/annex2.htm> (visited Oct. 29, 1999) (stating when
Canada deposited its instrument on December 17, 1998, the Convention was set to come
into effect sixty days later. Other countries depositing their instruments in 1998
include: Iceland (August 17), Japan (October 13), Germany (November 10), Hungary
(December 4), the United States (December 8), Finland (December 10), and the United
Kingdom (December 14). Other countries depositing their instruments in 1999 include:
Korea (January 4), Greece (February 5), Austria (May 20), Mexico (May 27), Sweden
(June 7), Belgium (July 27), Slovakia (September 24), and Australia (October 18)).
116. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 469 (the Draft Agreement required the criminaliza-
tion of corruption in international commercial transactions and laid out the jurisdic-
tional basis for the prosecution of the offense while further requiring transnational
corporations to keep accurate records of payments related to their international
business).
117. See Vincke, supra note 4 (naming the scandals of Italy, Spain, France, and
Belgium); Earle, supra note 34, at 226 ("recent events reflected in the headline 'Europe in
the Grip of Corruption Plague' suggest a continent confronting the economic conse-
quences of bribery").
118. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 469.
119. See G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in Inter-
national Commercial Transactions, December 16, 1996, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 1043.
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to foreign public officials and to deny tax deductibility of bribes. 120 The
Declaration, though not legally binding, focused on the supply side of cor-
ruption by reducing incentives to make corrupt payments. It represents the
growing anti-corruption sentiment in the international community.
At the regional level, several multilateral anti-corruption initiatives
have been taken. As the United States vehemently pushed for a strong rec-
ommendation from the OECD, it also pushed for a multilateral agreement
in the Organization of American States.121 Twenty-three countries signed
and enacted the 1996 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
(OAS Convention). 122 The Convention requires outlawing both supply
side and demand side corruption.123 The confluence of the FCPA regulat-
ing U.S. MNCs, the OAS Convention seeking criminalization of corrupt
activity, and NAFTA's North American Development Bank (NADB) requir-
ing companies seeking loans to certify that they have not engaged in brib-
ery or been convicted of bribery in the last five years, suggests a strong
anti-corruption sentiment in the Americas.' 24
The OAS Convention and NADB give citizens of Latin American coun-
tries a means by which to fight corruption domestically and governments
incentive to eradicate corruption. They curb the supply side of corruption
by tying contract validity to anti-bribery provisions. The regionalization of
anti-supply side corruption efforts does not only occur in the Americas
and with developing states, however. Europe's industrialized nations are
joining the fight against corruption as well.
In 1996, the European nations took regional action. The Multidiscipli-
nary Group on Corruption of the Council of Europe began work on two
draft conventions, one calling for the criminalization of corruption and the
other defining the terms of corruption. 125 These drafts led to further work
towards an European Union (EU) policy on corruption. 126
120. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 469-70.
121. See id. at 471 (stating that subject to the constitutional law of each member state,
the Convention outlaws both demand side and supply side corruption, covers the extra-
territorial application of bribery laws, and prohibits "illicit enrichment," defined as "any
unexplained significant increase in the assets of a government official").
122. See OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption, March 29, 1996,
reprinted in 35 L.L.M 724 (1996); Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (visited
Oct. 29, 1999) <http://www.oas.org/En/prog/juridico/english/Sigs/b-58.html>. (All
twenty-six members of the OAS have signed the Convention, and seventeen have ratified
the Convention).
123. See id. (all countries already outlaw the demand side of corruption. The prob-
lem is enforcement of such laws). See Low et al., supra note 71, at 246-55. See Bruce
Zagans & Shaila Ohri, The Emergence of an International Enforcement Regime on Trans-
national Corruption in the Americas, 30 LAw & POL'Y INr'L Bus. 53, 54-64 (1999).
124. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 472; Boswell, supra note 3, at 1171-73 (noting that
the OAS also approved a Program for Cooperation in the Fight Against Corruption on
June 2, 1997).
125. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 472 (the draft Framework Convention on Corrup-
tion requires the outlawing of corruption and the adoption of domestic legislation by
EU-members. The draft Convention on Corruption defines the forms of corruption,
including both supply-side and demand-side corruption).
126. See id. at 472-73 (further EU corruption policies included: a Protocol on Cor-
ruption to the EC Convention on the Protection of the Communities' Financial Interests
Vol. 33
2000 A Strategy to Combat Corruption
In 1997, the EU Commission adopted a Communication to the Coun-
cil and Parliament on a Union Policy Against Corruption.127 The Commu-
nication laid out a detailed policy program for action by the EU, its
member-nations, and those seeking to become members.1 28 This led to the
creation of a Draft Criminal Law Convention developed by the Council of
Europe in 1998.129 These initiatives curb the supply side of corruption
through monitoring the contracting procedures of MNCs and reducing the
incentives of international businesses to make corrupt payments. They are
indicative of the new anti-corruption sentiment in Europe. 130
Besides the Americas and Europe, the Pacific Rim nations have
attempted to address issues of corruption. In 1997, the PBEC produced a
Statement modeled after the ICC Rules of Conduct.131 The PBEC State-
ment presents a set of standards of corporate behavior for members to fol-
low. 132 Such standards present the first step for Pacific Rim countries to
follow the lead of other areas of the world.
3. Domestic Initiatives Targeting the Demand Side of Corruption133
Nations regulate the behavior of domestic public officials through domes-
tic legislation. Nearly all countries have laws which outlaw bribery of pub-
lic officials. 134 The Indian Penal Code exemplifies a domestic initiative
that targets demand side corruption. Sections 161, 162, and 165 combine
and a Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European
Communities as Officials of Member States of the European Union).
127. See Boswell, supra note 3, at 1170-71.
128. See id. (noting that the Commission proposed to endorse the OECD Recommen-
dation, abolish tax deductibility, strengthen procurement, accounting, and auditing
requirements, and develop stronger anti-corruption measures in EU foreign aid
programs).
129. See Draft Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (visited Oct. 29, 1999) <http://
www.coe.fr/cm/dec/1998/646/x4.htm>.
130. European nations once opposed U.S. anti-corruption efforts in the OECD. As
Council of Europe Legal Affairs expert Robert Lamponi stated in June 1994,
Up until recently people knew corruption existed but didn't see it as a problem
of society. Now it is obvious there's a major problem with clear international
implications . . . With the collapse of communism, the great presence of the
state has vanished in the east, leaving every little official who holds a portion of
power tempted to exploit it for his own personal gain.
Earle, supra note 34, at 226-227 (suggesting that the wave of scandals in Europe are
forcing European nations to cope with the economic consequences of corruption).
131. All 20 members of the PBEC approved the Statement on Standards for Transac-
tions Between Business and Governments (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://
vww.pbec.org/home>. The members include CEOs, Chairmen, and Senior executives
from the most important companies in the region.
132. See Stuart H. Denning, Foreign Corrupt Practices, 32 Ir'nL LAw. 463, 467 (such
standards include: "respect for national laws; avoidance of improper inducements;
appropriate remuneration and control of agents; proper financial recording and audit-
ing, transparency and disclosure of political contribution as required by law; and devel-
opment of company codes of conduct.").
133. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68, Figure 1, Quadrant 3.
134. See Muffler, supra note 12, at 5; Michael A. Almond & Scott D. Syfert, Beyond
ompliance: Corruption, Corporate Responsibility and Ethical Standards in the New Global
Economy, 22 N.C.J. INTL' & CoM. REG. 389, at 240 (citing Gregory Miles, Crime, Corrup-
tion, and Multinational Business, Ir'L Bus., July 1995, at 34-35).
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to prohibit public servants, and those close to them, from taking bribes in
order to influence behavior. 135 "Most foreign companies[, though,] still
make bribes as they do not fear prosecution under Indian law."'136 Other
examples of local prohibition of bribery include the Navajo Nation Code
and Saudi Arabian Law. The Navajo Nation Code prohibits tribal officials,
judges, or employees from receiving a benefit intended to influence such
person's discretion. 137 In Saudi Arabia, demand-side bribery occurs when
an official solicits "for himself as a third party, or accepted or received a
promise or a gift to perform any duties of his function." 138
Prohibition against bribery is also found in the Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion. Exodus pronounces: "You are not to accept a bribe, for the bribe
blinds clear-sighted men and can distort the words of the righteous
man."139 Neither the coercive power of the state nor the moral force of
biblical law has ebbed the flow of global corruption.
The fact that laws exist provides no solace when enforcement is lax,140
or when corruption is an accepted practice. "[Sltrong evidence suggests
that many countries, not solely those in the developing world, are unwill-
ing or unable to enforce domestic anti-bribery legislation against their own
government officials."141 Domestic initiatives targeting the demand side of
corruption naively ask corrupt leaders to judge themselves.
4. International Initiatives Targeting the Demand Side of Corruption14 2
While domestic demand side initiatives have self-enforcement problems,
international initiatives targeting demand side corruption do not face such
a dilemma. International demand side initiatives substitute international
judgment for domestic judgment by allowing international actors, such as
the World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), and Transparency
International (TI), to set standards for government contracting, create edu-
cational programs for citizens, and hear citizens' claims of corrupt activity.
Such initiatives enable citizens to hold their corrupt public officials
accountable.
135. See JAsPAL SINGH, THE INDIA PENAL CODE 545-59 (1994); H.P. VARSHNI, LAW OF
BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION 37 (1963).
136. Toral Patel, Corrupt Practices in India: No Payoff, 20 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. LJ.
389, 399 (1998).
137. See NATION CODE tit. 17, § 360(A)(1) (Equity 1995). A Tribal official who
accepts a bribe may be removed from office. Id. § 365.
138. Combatting Bribery Law, Official Gazette No. 3414, art. 1 (July 31, 1992) (Saudi
Arabia), reprinted in 9 ARAB. L.Q. 283, 283 (1994).
139. Exodus 23:8.
140. One example of lax enforcement would be the Marcos' regime in the Philippines,
under which $500 million of annual assistance was misused or stolen. See Hartman,
supra note 10, at 169. Another example is the inefficient system of cronyism found in
Indonesia where the IMF recently demanded austerity measures to be taken. See
Surjadinata, supra note 28, at 1077-78. One final example includes Thai government
officials who hold personal stakes in troubled financial institutions and have a natural
reluctance to discipline them. See Neel Chowdhury & Anthony Paul, Where Asia Goes
from Here, FORTUNE, Nov. 24, 1997, at 103.
141. Gantz, supra note 53, at 468; see supra Part I.A.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68, Figure 1, Quadrant 4.
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The World Bank and IMF, two international financial institutions
(IFIs) who lend to developing nations, offer several strategies to curb cor-
ruption. These strategies include: the participation of affected peoples
and NGOs, such as TI, during project design; IFI supervision and auditing
requirements during project implementation; the incorporation of new "no
bribery" clauses into loan agreements by the parties; and outside firm post-
review audits of procurements on a country basis.143 Such initiatives are
private in nature and allow for flexibility in their creation.
The WTO recently prepared a Government Procurement Agreement
covering the purchase of goods and services, including public works and
public utilities, to ensure that the international procurement process was
open and transparent. 14 4 Such an arrangement on transparency, open-
ness, and due process in government procurement did not receive wide
acceptance when it came into force in January of 1996. As international
public opinion for anti-corruption efforts increases, acceptance of transpar-
ent government procurement increases. 1
45
For efforts of international financial and trade organizations to suc-
ceed, the grass-roots organization Transparency International must shape
international public opinion. TI, formed in 1993 and modeled after
Amnesty International, 14 6 seeks to raise public awareness and mobilize
civil society and the private sector to work in coalition in over seventy
countries with TI national chapters. The national chapters work with gov-
ernment and institutional leaders on initiatives that would support sys-
temic reform. 14 7 TI has been a catalyst for anti-corruption initiatives in the
domestic and international realms. 148
143. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 479-81; Boswell, supra note 3, at 1169, 1173
(asserting that international financial institutions are taking stock of the roles they can
play in combating corruption).
144. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 470 (A Working Group on Transparency in Gov-
ernment Procurement facilitated the negotiation of the Government Procurement Agree-
ment). Greater transparency allows all internal activities of a country to be vieved
without obstacles. "States can reduce inefficient practices by increasing the visibility of
how rules govern transactions between parties." Surjadinata, supra note 28, at 1081.
145. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 470.
146. See Introducing TI, supra note 15, at 1; David C. Scott, Organization Aims to Shed
Light on Shady Deals Worldwide, CHRISTLAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 23, 1994, at 6 ("[un the
same way Amnesty International exposes human rights abuses, TI is... [a] Berlin-based
organization dedicated to exposing the misuse of public power for personal profit.").
147. See Boswell, supra note 3, at 1168-69.
148. See generally NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYsTEms: Tua TI SOURCE BoOK (Jeremy Pope
ed., 2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter THE TI SoURCE BooK]. The TI Source Book outlines the
steps countries must take to combat corruption. TI creates islands of integrity through
Integrity Pacts, which require anti-bribery commitments in specific government contract
settings. Examples include: a refinery rehabilitation project in Ecuador (1994), the
privatization of telecommunications in Panama (1996), and procurement in the provin-
cial government of Mendoza (1997). See Transparency International, Islands of Integrity:
The Integrity Pact (visited Mar. 3, 1999) -http://wvwv.transparency.de/activities/integ-
rity-pact.html>. TI raises public awareness through its national chapters. Such activities
include: publishing opinion polls (TI Bangladesh, TI Denmark), work on education
tools for school children (TI Denmark, TI Venezuela), highlighting particular issues in
local newspapers (TI Malaysia, TI Tanzania), publishing regular newsletters (TI Austra-
lia, TI Bangladesh, TI Canada, TI Germany), and holding national anti-corruption panels
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International initiatives targeting demand side corruption will aid in
securing the political will necessary to affect internal change, broaden the
geographic scope of corruption control, and level the playing field for all
MNCs.149
II. A New Multi-Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption
Combating corruption requires a multi-layered strategy. 150 First, nations
must introduce fundamental reform into their legal, economic, and admin-
istrative sectors to attack the roots of corruption. Second, the international
community must give citizens an avenue for holding corrupt public offi-
cials accountable by introducing international initiatives and machinery.
Roadblocks to international initiatives may slow the progress of anti-cor-
ruption efforts, but they are not insurmountable. Incorporating domestic
groups with new and old international machinery will create a hierarchy
through which citizens may bring claims of corruption. Combating cor-
ruption requires laying the domestic foundation and creating an interna-
tional structure for holding domestic officials accountable in the
international realm.
A. Foundational Principles: Attacking the Roots of Corruption
The foundation of anti-corruption efforts lies within fundamental reform.
Even though corruption requires a complex multi-pronged approach to
combat it, very basic steps can be taken to lay the proper foundation on
which further anti-corruption efforts can be built. Such steps include eco-
nomic, administrative, and legal reform.' 51
(TI Morocco, TI Uganda). See Transparency International, National Chapter Activities
(visited Mar. 3, 1999) <http://www.transparency.de/activities/chapter-activities.html>.
149. See Mark Pieth, International Cooperation to Combat Corruption, in CORRupnON
AN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 129-31 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997) (stating that interna-
tional organizations will have the role to build political will and broaden the geographic
scope of anti-corruption initiatives through peer review and follow-up procedures. Fur-
thermore, the expansion of anti-corruption efforts must bind all major competitors
simultaneously so as to ease the anxieties of the business community).
150. This Note offers a new weapon in the anti-corruption arsenal aimed at the
demand side of corruption because supply side initiatives have been taken and are cur-
rently on many international institutions agendas.
Because combatting corruption is such a difficult undertaking, there are no sim-
ple solutions. To make progress requires action on many fronts. Corruption
must be attacked from both the demand side and the supply side: by private-
sector initiatives, such as corporate codes of conduct; by public-sector reforms,
such as more transparent procurement rules, deregulation, and privatization; by
better enforcement of existing laws prohibiting bribery of domestic officials; by
ending tax deductibility of bribes; by stricter auditing, accounting, and corpo-
rate disclosure rules; by providing easier access to government information and
greater freedom to criticize government officials; and by defining clearer con-
flict-of-interest and ethics rules.
Heimann, supra note 91, at 148.
151. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 463-68 (positing that although economic reforms
do not specifically target corruption, they do have a positive effect for anti-corruption
efforts; legal and administrative reforms are essential to the appropriate and efficient
operation of the government).
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Corruption equals monopoly power plus discretion minus accounta-
bility.152 Reformers must aim anti-corruption efforts at these three compo-
nents of corruption. This requires economic reform in the public sector to
eliminate monopoly power, administrative reform to weaken discretion,
and legal reform to strengthen accountability. 153
Economic reform would include liberalization of markets, demono-
polization of services, and deregulation. 15 4 These measures would open
up markets to competition and allow market discipline to regulate indus-
tries rather than the state by allowing the private sector to determine mar-
ket price, economies of scale, supply, and demand.1 55 Market mechanisms
would further ensure greater transparency and accountability by eliminat-
ing the complexity and secrecy of bureaucracy.' 5 6 States must limit the
role of the government in the private sector.' 57
Administrative reform, accordingly, must accompany economic
reform. Reformers must make corruption more risky and more costly, by
increasing the probabilities of detection and punishment.' 5 8 As the
probability of detection of corrupt activities increases, through greater
monitoring or enforcement, the amount of corrupt activities entered into
decreases.' 5 9
Increasing risks and costs is not enough, though. States must weaken
the discretion given to public officials, by allowing market mechanisms to
work.160 Governments must give incentives to public officials to stop cor-
152. See Klitgaard, supra note 22.
153. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 463-68.
154. See id. at 463. Citizens must work to get government out of the business of
bribery.
155. See Surjadinata, supra note 28, at 1069-70 ("in addition to the possibility that
state governments will reduce their inefficient practices sua sponte and obtain the inci-
dental rewards therefrom, markets may alternatively discipline governments to reform
their inefficient institutions.").
156. See Rose-Ackerman supra note 21, at 41 ("Corrupt businesses and officials may
create an elaborate structure of shell companies with offshore addresses to hide their
peculation. They may engage in other costly efforts to cover their tracks.").
157. "[Tlhe larger the role of the state, the greater the probability that its instruments
will be used by public officials and civil servants to favor particular groups in addition
to themselves." Vito Tanzi, Corruption, Governmental Activities, and Markets, FIN. &
DEv., Dec. 1995, at 26. Reformers must beware, however, for if they do note first engen-
der strong and effective institutions even privatization authorities and regulatory bodies
may become corrupt See Glynn et al., supra note 3, at 11 ("Government officials in
charge of privatizing publicly owned assets can become instant tycoons by selling them
at low prices for a bribe or even acquiring them through their family or friends"); Rose-
Ackerman, supra note 21, at 42-43 (noting examples of corruption in privatizations: in
Argentina, privatizations favored those with inside information and connections; in
Thailand, privatizations include kickbacks and commission fees; and in the former east-
ern bloc, some privatizations have involved similar corrupt activities).
158. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21, at 40, 46-50 ("The expected cost of bribery is
the probability of being caught times the probability of being convicted times the pun-
ishment levied.").
159. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 464-65; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21, at 48 (argu-
ing that as the expected penalty increases, the level of peculation increases).
160. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21, at 51-53; Surjadinata, supra note 28, at 1081-
84 (arguing that the market will compel privatization of formerly state monopolized
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ruption, both through vigorous enforcement of anti-bribery laws and crea-
tion of "whistle-blower" statutes. 161 Without enforcement of laws by the
legal authorities, officials will continue their corrupt practices.
Legal reform must accompany administrative and economic reform.
States need to strengthen their enforcement of laws and punishment of
offenders. Increased monitoring, investigating, and evaluating help lessen
corruption, for as the chances of detection increase, incidences of corrup-
tion will decrease. x62 Increased punishment, severe enough to deter offi-
cials from taking the most exorbitant bribe,163 should parallel increased
enforcement. Such legal reform would decrease the incidence of
corruption. 164
Many scholars criticize international demands for structural
reform.165 They claim that reforms enacted too quickly create instability
in a country by increasing interest rates and destabilizing prices.166 There-
fore, reforms should be implemented over a period of time to lessen the
possibility of instability.
The reforms discussed above create a foundation and a climate in
which open markets and democracies can thrive. Corruption flounders
when market mechanisms rather than public officials determine the course
of business rather than public officials. Open political systems expose cor-
ruption to the public, allowing citizens to choose non-corrupt leaders.
Many countries may not embrace reforms if their culture and tradition
accept "corrupt practices," which could undermine anti-corruption strate-
gies of many nations.
B. Roadblocks to Holding Domestic Officials Accountable in the
International Realm
This section discusses three roadblocks to holding officials accountable in
the international arena: the roadblock of culture, the roadblock of sover-
industries, thus taking decisions out of the discretion of public officials and putting
them into the realm of market discipline).
161. "If [anti-corruption efforts are] effective, the perceived risks will deter civil ser-
vants from accepting or extorting payments." Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21, at 49 (sug-
gesting that governments should consider promulgating whistle-blower statutes that
encourage the reporting of malfeasance); see also Steve H. Hanke, The Curse of Corrup-
tion, FoRBEs, July 29, 1996, at 103 (reporting that a low threat of punishment induces
corrupt behavior).
162. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 464-65; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21, at 40.
163. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21, at 48 (suggesting that penalties must be tied
to the marginal benefits of the payoffs received, so that as the risk increases so does the
penalty); Shihata, supra note 14, at 465. "The taking of a bribe or gratuity should be
punished with as severe penalties as defrauding of the State." William Penn, Some Fruits
of Solitude, in REFLECTIONS AND MAXMs (Edmond Goss, ed., Folcroft Library 1965).
164. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21, at 40, 46-50 ("The expected cost of bribery is
the probability of being caught times the probability of being convicted times the pun-
ishment levied.").
165. See generally M.R Agosin & Fj. Prieto, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Poli-
cies: Pieces of a New Strategic Approach to Development, UNCTAD, TRANSNATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS 63 (1993).
166. See id.
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eignty, and the roadblock of standing and other jurisdictional issues. Anti-
corruption efforts must bypass these roadblocks to achieve effective
results. In order to prevail over the roadblock of culture, anti-corruption
efforts must overcome the fact that many countries have traditions which
western states label as corrupt.
1. The Roadblock of Culture
Many countries of the world voice strong criticism towards the criminaliza-
tion of practices held to be cultural in their societies, namely: gift-giving
and intense loyalty to family and friends. 167 Defining such practices as a
crime does nothing but cause disregard for the law, for officials will con-
tinue to follow their cultural traditions rather than the new "western"
laws. 168 This section discusses states' cultural objections to value-based
conceptions of corruption. First, it explains such problematic traditions.
Then, it details the problems presented by imposing international law.
In Africa and Asia, gift-giving is a pivotal aspect of common social
interactions. 169 In the context of Africa and Asia, gift-giving was obliga-
tory, and many times embedded in the framework of society.170 Gifts cre-
167. The system of cronyism found in Indonesia where the IMF recently demanded
austerity measures to be taken is an example of gift giving tradition. See Surjadinata,
supra note 28, at 1077-78. Former head of government of Nigeria, General Obasanjo
stated
I shudder at how an integral aspect of our culture could be taken as the basis for
rationalizing otherwise despicable behavior. In the African concept of apprecia-
tion and hospitality, the gift is usually a token. It is not demanded. The value is
usually in the spirit rather than in the material worth. It is usually done in the
open, and never secret. Where it is excessive, it becomes an embarrassment and
it is returned. If anything, corruption has perverted and destroyed this aspect of
our culture.
THE TI SOURCE BOOK, supra note 148, at 5. In the Far East, there also are complaints that
traditional practices are now corrupt: "Once, the exchanging of gifts was a laudable
social custom emphasizing the importance of personal relations in social life. Now,
bongtoo and chongji have distorted the practice into institutionalized bribery in the name
of goodwill tokens." THE TI SOURCE BOOK, supra note 148, at 5. Although the commen-
tators on Nigerian and Far Eastern customs call them distortions of an honorable tradi-
tion, the people of these countries still follow them. See Michael Johnston, The Political
Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment, COMP. PoL., June 1986, at 463. Johnston
suggests that
[t]he existence of ethnic factions among elites, the extent to which kinship
norms mean that citizens and/or officials take a different view of patronage
practices than does the law, or the exclusion of certain economic interests from
decision-making processes, for example, can all be critical p'arts of the corrup-
tion story in specific settings.
Id.
168. See Surjadinata, supra note 28, at 1040.
169. See Steven R. Salbu, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and
Desirable International Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Cen-
tury, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223, 232-39 (1999); Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational
Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. IN'L L. 257, 292-97
(1999); JAMEs C. SCOTT, COMPARATIVE PoLncAL CORRUPTION 10 (1972).
170. See Surjadinata, supra note 28, at 1039; THE TI SOURCE BOOK, supra note 148, at
5. "According to Chris Pash, CEO of Asia Pulse, 'great ceremonial significance is
attached to the giving and receiving of gifts' in Asia, such that 'it's extremely important
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ate a personal connection between citizens.171 Further, since elites were
most often obligated to give gifts, the tradition of gift-giving can be viewed
as a symbolic redistribution of wealth.172
Along with gift-giving practices, many African and Asian cultures
include an intense loyalty to family and friends.173 The two practices
ingrain a culture with the custom of "I will scratch your back, if you will
scratch mine."174
Against the backdrop of loyalty and gift-giving, value-based "western"
laws that proscribe "bribery" create conflicting priorities for officials in
developing states. 175 When faced with the choice, tradition will always win
out over new legal norms.176 The imposition of western values on develop-
to be familiar with the customs, nuances, and cultural taboos in various countries.'"
Salbu, supra note 169, at 235 (quoting How Gifts Can Build Stronger Business Relation-
ships with Your Asian Hosts and Partners, PR NawswiRE, Mar. 29, 1998, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Allnews File).
Furthermore, "[iun Japan, failure to tender appropriate summer and year end business
gifts is considered a terrible breach of etiquette." See Salbu, supra note 169, at 237
(quoting DIANA RowAND, JAPANESE BUSINESS ETIQUETrE: A PRAncICAL GUIDE TO SUCCESS
WITH THE JAPANESE 80-82 (1985)).
171. See Surjadinata, supra note 28, at 1040 ("When gift-giving is practiced univer-
sally, the whole society becomes inextricably networked in gift-giving practices, and
such activities become an expected, customary gesture governing many activities").
Jeffrey Fadiman noted an example of gifts creating personal connections in East
Africa. At the end of a business transaction, an East African requested money and a
radio so as to celebrate the completion of the transaction. See Jeffrey A. Fadiman, A
Traveler's Guide to Gifts and Bribes, HAgv. Bus. Rnv., July-Aug. 1986, at 122. At first,
Fadiman was uncomfortable with the request, but once the East African relayed the true
motive and culture, Fadiman was more comfortable. See id. at 123.
Furthermore, "Korean culture stresses reciprocation as the foundation to interper-
sonal relationships." Daniel Y. Tun, Note, Bribery Among the Korean Elite: Putting an
End to a Cultural Ritual and Restoring Honor, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1071, 1084
(1996). Korean reciprocation comes in the form of chonji, an expression of gratitude
iusually in the form of gifts. See Agenda for a New Leader, ASIAWEEc, Mar. 13, 1998, at
14.
172. See Surjadinata, supra note 28, at 1040.
173. Vito Tanzi, now the head of fiscal affairs in the IMF, stated that "family or other
kinds of relationships are very strong, and especially where existing moral or social
codes require that one help family and friends, the expectation that the public employee
will routinely apply arm's length principles... is unrealistic." Tanzi, supra note 157, at
25.
"The culture of Indonesia ... strongly favors gift-giving, particularly as a means of
expressing gratitude and loyalty to authority figures or to reward service." Salbu, supra
note 169, at 235 (quoting Donna K. Woodward, Foreigners Fattened RI's Graft, JAKARTA
PosT, Dec. 17, 1997, at 4.
174. See Surjadinata, supra note 28, at 1040. The institution of chonji is ingrained in
Korean culture, leading to the delivery of gifts for leniency from teachers, favorable inter-
est rates from bankers, or expedited administrative troubleshooting from government
bureaucrats. See Salbu, supra note 169, at 235-36.
175. See id. ("The developing state official faces two competing alternatives: to
advance the public objective of his position in accord with post-colonial government
structures, or to deliver on the obligation owed to his family and friends in accordance
with tradition.").
176. See id.; ScoTT, supra note 169, at 11 ("new administrative practices fare poorly in
most transitional economies"). "To enter another country and attack its institutions
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ing nations is seen as "cultural imperialism."'177 "Developing states per-
ceive extraterritorial application of value-based laws [like the FCPA] as a
legally disguised attempt to impose western values." 178 Developing states
have different value systems than western states, and believe that western
states' "cultural imperialism" is an affront to the international principle of
territorial sovereignty. 179 The argument of "cultural imperialism" comes at
the intersection of cultural and sovereignty roadblocks, and therefore
requires an adequate response.
An adequate response would either take local laws into account or use
a non-value-based definition of corruption. Since nearly all countries have
laws criminalizing bribery of public officials, 180 local laws can be taken
into account in defining indigenous spoliation as an international
crime.18 1 In the alternative, the international community could also
choose to use the market to determine what practices should be deemed
corrupt. 18 2 Either choice would lessen the effectiveness of the corruption
challenge to international anti-corruption efforts.
International initiatives must allow citizens to affect internal change
because citizens are more able to adapt anti-corruption efforts to their own
culture. 183 Externalities, such as the World Bank requiring a certain policy
or an international administrative agency requiring compliance, cannot be
with a sledge hammer is never prudent, even if strong arguments can be made that the
institutions are dysfunctional." Salbu, supra note 169, at 236.
177. See Surjadinata, supra note 28, at 1026-27 ("developing states perceive the FCPA
as a culturally arrogant encroachment on their ability to govern activities exclusively
within their borders"). See Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to
Include a Private Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 185, 204-05 (1994); see Nichols, supra
note 169, at 298.
178. Suijadinata, supra note 28, at 1036.
179. Louis HENKIN Er AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-16 (3d ed. 1993) ("The essential
quality of Statehood in a State system is the autonomy of each State. State autonomy
suggests that a State is not subject to any external authority unless it has voluntarily
consented to such authority.").
180. See Muffler, supra note 12, at 5; Hartman, supra note 10, at 168; supra text
accompanying notes 67-68, Figure 1, Quadrant 3.
181. Criminalization of bribery can rest upon the laws of each nation, thus allowing
for cultural variances while retaining some teeth through actual enforcement. See Steven
R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 419, 422-29 (1999) (discussing the need to interpret the nuances of a host coun-
try's law in the context of the host country's culture).
182. See Surjadinata, supra note 28, at 1046-47, 1052 (discussing corruption from the
standpoint of efficient and inefficient practices). The FCPA and the "western" view of
corruption tends to label corruption as evil. Professor Surjadinata believes this view to
be overinclusive. Some efficient practices are included in the western view of corrup-
tion. Efficient practices should not be proscribed and that market considerations
should regulate whether activity is inefficient, i.e. corrupt. For Professor Surjadinata,
culturally specific legal norms and presents a market-oriented approach to governing
corrupt practices as an opportunity for wester and developing states to converge their
objectives for economic growth. See id.
183. Salbu notes that the practice of chonji "is better addressed internally," with the
task of improving dysfunctional institutions "better left to the host country." Salbu,
supra note 169, at 236.
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the sole reason for change.' 8 4 In fact, externalities 18 5 may be turned away
because of another roadblock to anti-corruption strategies: sovereignty.
2. The Roadblock of Sovereignty
Sovereignty has frustrated many international initiatives over the years. 18 6
First, this section explains the concept of sovereignty. Then, it describes
the implications for sovereignty when nations sign international agree-
ments or submit to customary international law. Lastly, it presents a solu-
tion to this roadblock of sovereignty by treating indigenous spoliation as a
violation of human rights, thus placing individual responsibility upon cor-
rupt officials.
The basis of sovereignty is the principle of par in parem imperium non
habet (an equal has no dominion over an equal). The United Nations
upholds this principle of international law as a basis of its creation. 18 7
States interprete this principle to mean they have complete dominion over
the resources under their control. 188 Over the years, this absolute theory of
sovereignty underwent much criticism, leading to a more restrictive theory
of sovereignty. 189
184. An externality is a catalyst from without the state, rather than from within the
state. See THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 468 (1st ed. 1984). International
organizations and international initiatives that cause changes within nations are exter-
nalities to the extent they are not encompassed by domestic initiatives. Whereas inter-
nal laws have some modicum of legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, international
initiatives seldom are understood or trusted by the people of nations. The extra dis-
tance, both physically and culturally, between citizens and international initiatives does
not allow sound foundations to be built.
185. See id.
186. Sovereignty proved a barrier to the FCPA, for public officials could not be held
accountable in U.S. courts. United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991); see
Earle, supra note 34, at 225 (The U.N. Declaration and OECD Recommendation were
not able to become legally binding because of nations who believed corruption to be an
internal, domestic issue); KOFELE-KALE, supra note 9, at 219 (arguing that sovereignty
has been turned into a protective shield to keep perpetrators of acts of indigenous spolia-
tion beyond the jurisdictional reach of both domestic and foreign courts).
187. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1.
188. See KoFELE-KALE, supra note 9, at 221 ("Over the last several centuries the Euro-
pean concept of the State has taken on the trappings of a legal cult which the legal order
appears unwilling or unable to deviate from lest, perhaps, it fall under suspicion for
apostasy.").
189. Over the years, the absolute theory of sovereignty has not remained static. There
have been numerous challenges to this theory of the state, by theoreticians such as Hegel
and Marx. See KOFELE-KALE, supra note 9, at 229, 242 ("ringing endorsement[s] of limits
of sovereignty provide the jurisprudential compass for navigating around the contempo-
rary shoals of sovereign immunity defenses whenever these are raised by modern sover-
eigns in the context of spoliation disputes"). The restrictive theory of sovereignty,
accounts for the state as a private actor in the international sphere. Public acts of gov-
ernments are unreviewable. Private acts of governments are reviewable, and some writ-
ers suggest framing corruption in terms of a private act of a public official. See id. at
240 (if sovereignty exists to serve the ends of the state, then sovereignty should not be
allowed to be used as a shield by corrupt public officials). When one looks at human
rights conventions and commissions, sovereignty proves to be less of a roadblock. See
id. at 107-08 (Many conventions refer to a "peoples'" right to freely dispose of their
natural wealth. This creates an affirmative duty on the government to use the economic
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Even beyond the trend of decreasing sovereignty, states become legally
obligated by treaty or by customary international law.190 The principle of
jus cogens creates a norm of international law so fundamental that states
cannot agree to contravene it.' 91 States are less effective in presenting sov-
ereignty objections in the face of their legal obligations to international
society.
To overcome the roadblock of sovereignty, the international commu-
nity could place the corruption discussion under the rubric of human
rights. Since the time of Nfirnberg, sovereignty objections have collided
with the fact that prosecuting human rights violations is a norm erga
omnes.192 Some commentators believe indigenous spoliation violates
human rights by taking away from the people their power to efficiently
dispose of their resources:193
The right of a people not to be dispossessed of their wealth and natural
resources is not just any ordinary human right, but the fundamental human
right. This right transcends all other rights and gives some semblance of
form and shape to - and in a very real sense qualifies - all other rights. Acts
of indigenous spoliation violate fundamental human rights.' 94
If one sees indigenous spoliation as a violation of human rights, much like
torture or slavery, then it becomes an international crime that circumvents
state sovereignty. 195 Similar to characterizing indigenous spoliation as a
violation of human rights, the international community could bypass the
interests in the country for the whole population.). Also, globalization and interdepen-
dence suggest that economically weaker states may implicitly surrender the concept of
sovereignty. They yield some of their sovereignty claims to more powerful states and the
most critical international organizations. See id. at 227-28 (An example of this would be
the case of Mozambique. As Mozambique received structural adjustment and sectoral
programs from the World Bank and IMF, they allowed extensive instructions by outside
agencies over what had been viewed as wholly domestic. Mozambique chose keeping
foreign aid and ceding substantial control to external agencies to avoid economic col-
lapse rather than retaining control over political arrangements and policy choices).
190. Becoming a party to a treaty creates a legal obligation in that state; the opinio
juris of customary international law is when states believe they have a legal obligation to
follow the norm of customary international law. Whereas treaty-signing is an express
consent, customary international law is based upon implied consent. Customary inter-
national law is dynamic, with new norms created over time. Due to the recent uprise
against corruption, curbing corruption may be or soon will be a part of customary inter-
national law. See id. at 111-12.
191. Jus cogens, also referred to as a peremptory norm, is a rule of customary interna-
tional law. A related norm, erga omnes, places an international duty upon states to vin-
dicate community interests. Jus cogens and erga omnes obligations represent two forms
of protection of matters of paramount importance to international society. Some would
suggest that stopping corruption falls within these doctrines. See id. at 62-66; Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, May 23, 1969, art. 64
(allowing for the emergence of new peremptory norms).
192. See KoFELE-KALE, supra note 9, at 361.
193. See id. at 105; Hartman, supra note 10, at 170
194. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Patrimonicide: The International Economic Crime of Indige-
nous Spoliation, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 45, at 113 (1996). Indigenous spoliation
decimates the wealth of the nation, leaving the poor impoverished, the hungry starving,
and the homeless unsheltered. See KoF.EL-KmLE, supra note 9, at 105.
195. See KoFELE-KALE, supra note 9, at 55-56.
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sovereignty roadblock by holding public officials individually responsible
for violating the fiduciary duty they owe their citizens. 196
However, holding individuals responsible leads to several procedural
issues. Even though time has eroded the substance of sovereignty, proce-
dural by-products of sovereignty are still prevalent. 197 These procedural
by-products present a further roadblock to anti-corruption strategies:
standing and jurisdictional issues.
3. The Roadblock of Standing and Other Jurisdictional Issues
This section examines the procedural and jurisdictional roadblocks to anti-
corruption initiatives. First, it presents examples of standing. Then, this
section examines reasons and ways to limit standing, due to a concern that
threat of suit could be used to extort government contracts. Next, it ana-
lyzes the Act of State doctrine and Forum Non Conveniens. Finally, this
section discusses the fact that new international machinery would reduce
the effect of the standing and jurisdictional roadblocks.
Standing hampers the struggle against corruption by limiting those
who can sue to hold public officials accountable. The ICC allows its
national chapters to bring suits, as well as anyone who believes a legitimate
violation of the Rules of Conduct has occurred. 198 The International
Court of Justice only allows states to be parties. 199 The European Court of
Justice, on the other hand, allows private causes of action.200 Yet, both
courts only obtain jurisdiction upon consent by parties through treaties or
other documentation. 201 There are sound reasons for limiting access to
these courts.
Litigating corruption claims presents a situation in which standing
should be limited. A delicate balance arises between the ability to sue in
court and the ability to put pressure on public officials to grant govern-
196. Holding individuals responsible, rather than the state as a whole, lessens the
ability of a state to argue that anti-corruption efforts impinge on their sovereignty. See
id. at 113-64 (discussing the doctrine of fiduciary relations as creating a duty placed
upon public officials to protect the resources of the populace). Professor Kofele-Kale
gives several examples of legal grounding, such as Anglo-American law, Islamic law, and
Civil law. He further demonstrates that this fiduciary relationship between a public
official and his or her citizens is a matter of customary international law. See id.
197. Examples include the Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State doctrine,
founded upon more absolute ideas of sovereignty.
198. See Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, supra note 65.
199. See Statute of International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bev-
ans 1179, June 26, 1945, art. 34, para. 1 ("Only states may be parties in cases before the
Court").
200. See T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 49-50 (2d ed.
1988).
201. The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction for a limited number of inter-
national crimes. Limiting jurisdiction to consent of states and to certain subject matter
limit the possibilities of litigation in the field of corruption. Allowing private causes of
action which hold individuals accountable increase the possibilities of litigation, and
give citizens an avenue to prosecute public officials.
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ment contracts. 20 2 The double-edged sword of standing must be over-
come: there must be standing to allow citizens to hold corrupt officials
accountable, yet standing must be limited to present bribe-makers from
pressuring public officials into awarding contracts.
The most attractive solution to the delicate balance of standing is to
limit standing to those who truly want to hold public officials accounta-
ble.20 3 This suggests limiting standing to citizens affected by corrupt activ-
ities and national charters of Transparency International, two groups
which would have few ulterior motives. 20 4 Another possibility would be to
criminalize corruption and allow a prosecutor to bring daims.20 5 Limiting
standing in such ways lessens the opportunity for extortion by those seek-
ing government contracts.20 6
Standing is not the only jurisdictional roadblock to holding corrupt
officials accountable in the international realm. The doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens and Act of State present other jurisdictional roadblocks to
holding public officials accountable. 20 7 The Forum Non Conveniens Doc-
trine allows a court which has jurisdiction over a case to decline to hear the
case out of fairness to the parties if there is another court available which
would be more convenient.20 8 A more convenient forum would be the
202. Supply side standing presents less of a roadblock, for MNCs cannot use the
threat of litigation to pressure a domestic official in granting the contract to them. The
ICC process presents a supply side standing situation. National chapters of ICC and
other legitimate parties present cases against bribe-makers of the international realm,
rather than bribe-takers. See Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, supra note
65. Demand side standing presents the danger of allowing a MNC to put pressure on
public officials. Plaintiffs bring suit against public officials for alleged acts of corrup-
tion. If international businesses can threaten to be plaintiffs, then public officials may
avoid such embarrassment by granting the contract to the international business. This
danger can be avoided by limiting standing to citizens of the state (although national
businesses may then have an advantage) or to chapters of TI.
203. Other reasons to allow someone to seek redress in the international realm could
be to create more efficiency in government contracting by allowing MNCs to threaten
suit. This is not a desired result of holding public officials accountable in the interna-
tional realm, thus limitations should be placed upon standing.
204. The mission of TI is to increase the integrity of government as a whole and to
develop state-specific systems and procedures to prevent and contain corruption. See
THE TI SOURCE BOOK, supra note 148, at 5-6.
205. A prosecutor is under a duty to bring only justified charges against an alleged
offender. Therefore, a prosecutor would not have an ulterior motive. For a discussion of
the role of the ICC in combating corruption, see infra Part II.C.2.c.
206. An alternative argument to limiting standing in the international realm would be
to not have litigation in the international realm at all. Corruption is a wholly domestic
issue adequately addressed by internal processes. See Salbu, supra note 169, at 232.
Internal processes, however, can break down, especially in a corrupt setting. Police may
not arrest clearly corrupt superiors. Prosecutors may drop justified charges. The judici-
ary may dismiss strong cases. Litigants may not be willing to endanger their family and
friends. Many times, domestic enforcement is futile. See infra note 212.
207. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) (representing the most illustra-
tive applications of these common law doctrines); Piper Aircraft v. Hartzell Propeller,
Inc., 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (same).
208. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 235 (presenting a balancing test for Forum Non
Conveniens).
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nation in which the corruption occurred, thus plaintiffs would most likely
face judges favorable to the corrupt government officials.209
The Act of State doctrine substantively ends litigation by holding the
act of a sovereign valid.210 The Supreme Court decided that the Act of
State doctrine was not appropriate in a case where the litigant, rather than
asking the Court to determine the validity of an act of state, asked the
Court to determine the validity of a contract obtained via a bribe.211 This
suggests courts may circumvent the Act of State doctrine by determining
that corrupt acts are not valid acts of state.
These jurisdictional roadblocks are usually procedural in nature and
more often create roadblocks on the civil side of litigation.212 The Act of
State doctrine and doctrine Forum Non Conveniens apply in the federal
courts of the United States, where citizens may seek money damage
awards, not criminal accountability for corrupt actions. In criminal prose-
cutions, prosecutors have greater opportunities for jurisdiction. Due to the
burden of proof put upon a prosecutor, a court will usually be more lenient
209. "This doctrine [Forum Non Conveniens] tends to be fatal in application. In a
survey of the plaintiffs' lawyers in transnational cases that the federal courts dismissed
on forum non conveniens grounds from 1947-1984, responses covered 85 cases; of
those 85, not one resulted in a plaintiffs win in the foreign court; most cases were aban-
doned or settled for little." RICHARD H. FIELD Er AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 1083 (7th ed.
1997) (citing David W. Robertson, Forum Non conveniens in America and England: "A
Rather Fantastic Fiction," 103 LAw Q. REy. 398, 418-20 (1987)).
210. The Act of State doctrine rests upon the fact that all sovereigns are equals, and
thus, they cannot have dominion over one another. "Every sovereign state is bound to
respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done in its own terri-
tory." Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.
211. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp, 493 U.S. 400
(1990) (suggesting that the Act of State doctrine is not as prominent today as it once
was, especially in the commercial realm where states act as private agencies). Further-
more, the Act of State doctrine applies only in the context of public acts rather than
private acts. See Kofele-Kale, supra note 194, at 70 (noting that the commercial excep-
tion to the Act of State doctrine may allow more litigation in the civil field of corruption
control).
212. A counter argument to holding public officials accountable in other nations or in
the international realm, is that corruption is a domestic issue that should be left to
internal processes. What would normally be a jurisdictional roadblock, the doctrine of
exhaustion of remedies, may provide an argument in favor of using external processes.
The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies requires a complainant to exhaust local avenues
of justice before seeking international relief. See KoFELE-KALE, supra note 9, at 42. The
doctrine of exhaustion of remedies does note apply where there are no laws in the state
allowing relief or seeking redress within the state would be futile. See J. BRIERLY, THE
LAw OF NATIONS 276-87 (6th ed. 1963). Brierly notes that
[i]f the local tribunals are notoriously corrupt.., the individual is not required
"to exhaust justice when there is no justice to exhaust." Again, if the wrong has
been committed by... some high official, it not infrequently happens that the
local law provides no remedy and in that case there are no local remedies to
exhaust.
Id. In the corruption setting, enforcement of anti-bribery laws is non-existent and
attempting to hold public officials accountable domestically is not only dangerous, but
also futile. If no international avenue exists to hold public officials accountable, citi-
zens' actions to fight corruption may be hopeless.
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in allowing jurisdiction.213 To give citizens an alternative to the futility of
domestic claims, two legal initiatives become attractive: labeling indige-
nous spoliation as an international crime and creating international
machinery which allows appropriate parties to bring claims against public
officials.
C. Legal Initiatives
The roots of corruption and roadblocks to fighting corruption suggest that
the international community should divide initiatives to combat corrup-
tion into legal initiatives and policy initiatives. International legal initia-
tives should target accountability of public officials. Holding public
officials accountable through domestic enforcement has not proven effec-
tive.2 14 International policy initiatives should incorporate citizens and
grass roots organizations to combat monopoly power and discretion of
public officials.2 15
This section proposes two legal initiatives that target the accountabil-
ity of public officials: the criminalization of indigenous spoliation in the
international realm and the creation of international machinery to bolster
current international and domestic anti-corruption initiatives. First, this
section contemplates the creation of a multilateral treaty which criminal-
izes indigenous spoliation by public officials. Second, it examines the
bases for holding public officials accountable. Third, this section
addresses how the international community can bypass the roadblocks to
criminalization. Fourth, it recommends the creation of international
machinery. Finally, this section concludes that combining criminalization
of indigenous spoliation with international machinery aids citizens in
holding their corrupt public officials accountable.
213. A litigant loses control of the litigation, but also does not incur the costs of the
litigation. The litigant purportedly wants justice done, so concern about money dam-
ages is low, and the desire to hold a public official accountable is high. Further, crimi-
nal sanctions impugn the disfavor of the international community.
214. In Sierra Leone, after throwing out senior government ministers for their corrupt
activities, corruption persisted because "the organizational systems and culture have
remained unchanged. The circumstances that produced the corruption have let it hap-
pen again." THE TI SouRcE BooK, supra note 148, at 19. In Nigeria, "a state governor
used mobile police to take hostage the Chief Judge of that state and his other judges who
were presiding over an election case. The judges were not released until about 10 p.m.,
after a favorable judgment had been handed down." Id. at 59.
215. "[Tlhe ability of civil society to monitor, detect, and reverse the activities of pub-
lic officials in their midst is enhanced by proximity and familiarity with local issues."
Id. at 5, 18-20, 35-38 (further arguing that TI national chapters are crucial to involving
civil society in defending its essential interests. TI takes a holistic approach to combat-
ing corruption, realizing that the elimination of corruption is not an end in itself, but a
means to attain the broader goal of a more effective, fairer, and efficient government).
Limiting the role of the government in the economy should come through domestic
efforts rather than international externalities because of the cultural roadblock. See
supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text. Such domestic initiatives targeting monop-
oly power and discretion allow more internal stability for nations combating corruption.
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1. A New Anti-Corruption Treaty: The Criminalization of Indigenous
Spoliation
Now that the OECD has completed its convention which criminalizes inter-
national bribery, the international community should seek to criminalize
indigenous spoliation.2 16 Criminalization sends the powerful message
that citizens will no longer accept corruption, that local laws criminalizing
corruption will be supported internationally, and that the international
community cannot tolerate the repercussions of indigenous spoliation on
the international realm.2 17
a. Criminalization
Criminalizing indigenous spoliation would place it on a par with interna-
tional crimes such as slavery, torture, apartheid, and genocide. 218 Such
heinous violations of international law create enforceable claims against
the perpetrators. 2 19 These offenses are contrary to the interests of the
whole international community, and as such, must be wholly denounced
by the international community; so too must indigenous spoliation.2 20 A
name given to the crime of indigenous spoliation is "patrimonicide," mean-
ing "the laying waste of the wealth and resources belonging by right to a
nation's citizens.22 1 Many organizations have attempted to define interna-
tional crimes and draft international criminal codes, but the doctrine of
ubijus idi remedium (where there is a right there must be a remedy) and the
lack of a centralized international enforcement agency inhibited their ambi-
tious efforts. 22 2
i. The Draft Code of Crimes
In 1991, the International Law Commission attempted to define interna-
tional crimes in its Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace (Draft Code of
216. But see Muffler, supra note 12, at 15 (arguing that criminalization should not be
a part of a multilateral treaty because criminalization will be deemed American "moral
imperialism," and nations will not agree to it and proposing a multilateral treaty which
targets the supply side of corruption through civil actions); Surjadinata, supra note 28,
at 1052 (arguing that criminalization should be limited to inefficient behavior and
detailing the need to divide corruption into efficient and inefficient practices. Using
efficiency and market mechanisms to determine corrupt activities eliminates the over-
inclusion of efficient practices that a value-based system would include as corrupt). See
Salbu, supra note 169, at 251 (stating that "the external imposition of any one set of
norms and values is impracticable as well as imprudent").
217. See generally THE TI SouRcE BooK, supra note 148.
218. See KOFELE-KALE, supra note 9, at 55 ( noting that all of these crimes represent
instances when procedure is not a problem. Universal jurisdiction can be had because
of the heinousness of the crimes).
219. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text (discussing jus cogens and erga
omnes obligations).
220. See KOFEE-KALE, supra note 9, at 39 (discussing how the International Court of
Justice lent support to the notion that certain wrongs are of concern to the whole inter-
national community in the Barcelona Traction Case); Kofele-Kale, supra note 194, at 92..
221. Korutx-KALrE, supra note 9, at 14.
222. See id. at 39-40.
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Crimes).2 23 The Draft Code of Crimes listed international crimes of which
individuals could be held responsible. 224 It extended the list beyond that
of the Nfirnberg Charter, which suggests that the list is not exhaustive.
Today, a consensus has emerged that indigenous spoliation constitutes an
international crime.2 25
A consensus becomes binding law not only through treaties but also
through customary international law.22 6 If nations see indigenous spolia-
tion as an international crime worthy of imposing international sanctions,
then a custom of preventing indigenous spoliation becomes a reality. Cus-
tomary international law circumvents the need for a treaty, and creates a
more flexible alternative to the wooden language of a treaty. In fact, sup-
port for holding domestic officials accountable in the international realm
comes from a doctrine created at the end of colonialism: the doctrine of
fiduciary relations.2 27
ii. Customary International Law: Doctrine of Fiduciary Relations
A multilateral convention defining indigenous spoliation as an interna-
tional crime is not the only way to criminalize indigenous spoliation. The
edicts of customary international law may support criminalization. The
doctrine of Fiduciary Relations allows criminalizing indigenous spoliation
by treating it as a breach of a fiduciary duty.2 28 The bases for imposing
fiduciary duties upon public officials are borne from three theories: (1)
223. See Kofele-Kale, supra note 194, at 92 (noting that the Draft Code of Crimes
represented the global community's willingness to proscribe offenses that "attack the
very foundations of human existence, injure the vital interests of the international com-
munity, and regarded as criminal by that community as a whole").
224. See KOFELE-KAE, supra note 9, at 55 (stating that the Draft Code of Crimes put
its emphasis on individuals rather than states, since crimes are committed by individu-
als. In this light, the Code drafters looked to the Nfirnberg Charter for crimes which
held individuals responsible, which included: genocide, apartheid, and torture. Other
crimes for which individuals could be held responsible under the Draft Code include:
international terrorism, illicit traffic in drugs, and willful and severe damage to the envi-
ronment). There was also discussion of naming corruption a "crime against humanity."
Corruption in Government 24 (U.N. 1990), TCD/Sem. 90/2, INT-89-R56 (Report of an
Interregional Seminar held in the Hague, the Netherlands on Dec. 11-15, 1989). Since
indigenous spoliation is the most devastating form of corruption, it follows that indige-
nous spoliation would also fit as a "crime against humanity."
225. See KoFELE-KALE, supra note 9, at 66-70 (arguing that indigenous spoliation
meets all the tests presented by the ILC for its Draft Code of Crimes).
226. See supra note 190.
227. Customary international law allows for more flexibility in international enforce-
ment. States do not become parties to it, but are obliged to follow its dictates unless
they are a persistent objector from the first inception of customary international law.
228. See KoFEL.-KALE, supra note 9, at 113-64 (discussing the doctrine of fiduciary
relations as creating a duty placed upon public officials to protect the resources of the
populace. The author gives several examples of legal grounding, such as Anglo-Ameri-
can law, Islamic law, and Civil law. He further demonstrates that this fiduciary relation-
ship between a public official and his or her citizens is a matter of customary
international law); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRuSts § 2 (1959) ("A trust... is a fiduci-
ary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title of the
property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another
person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it").
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the entrusting theory; (2) the public trust theory; and (3) the voluntary
assumption of duty theory. 229
The entrusting theory advances the notion that the constitution grants
certain powers to public officials, which they abuse when indigenous spoli-
ation exists.230 The fiduciary's role in the entrusting theory is that of a
property-holder who manages property entrusted to him by the beneficiary
of the property's use, the populace.231 The theory indicates that public
officials are servants of the people and the government owes a fiduciary
duty of care to its citizens.232
The public trust theory bases itself upon the fact that citizens have an
indefeasible public interest in their public wealth and resources placed
under the guardianship of public officials.233 The doctrine rests upon the
idea that the state owes citizens a duty of care with respect to the disposal
of "common property" public resources. 234 These public resources are
held in a constructive trust for the people by public officials who must act
as representatives for the benefit of the whole citizenry in common. 235
The voluntary assumption of duty theory is founded upon the fact
that public officials seek public office and take an oath of office. 23 6 Fidu-
ciary obligations rest upon the premise that an individual consciously
chooses to seek public office. 23 7 Upon obtaining an office, the office-
holder must take an oath of office, which not only creates the fiduciary
obligation of the office but lays out the commitment the office-holder will
make in performing duties on the public's behalf. The delegation of consti-
tutional powers from the people to the official and the expectation that
such delegation will be used solely for the public good create the official's
fiduciary obligation.238
The union of all three theories present a compelling case that indige-
nous spoliation is an international wrong within customary international
law. When public officials allow inefficient projects to go through due to
their acceptance of bribes, they breach their fiduciary duty to the public.
This breach gives citizens a cause of action against their public officials in
the international realm.
Such strong arguments still encounter resistance. States will argue
that only they have the power to decide what crimes will be prosecuted
within their borders, and based on the culture and tradition of the nation,
states define crimes and the responsibility of leaders. The next section
offers rebuttals to these objections.
229. See KoFELE-KALE, supra note 9, at 146-56.
230. See id. at 146-49.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 149-51.
234. See id.
235. See id
236. See id. at 152-56.
237. See id.
238. See id.
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b. A Path around the Roadblocks
Whether the solution takes the form of a multilateral treaty or a statement
of customary international law, concern for the cultures of nations raises a
legitimate objection to criminalizing indigenous spoliation in the interna-
tional realm. A three step argument undermines the cultural objection.
First, nearly all countries have laws criminalizing bribery of public offi-
cials.2 39 Second, local laws can be taken into account in criminalizing
indigenous spoliation.240 Third, indigenous spoliation, as an economic
crime, can be couched in market-based terms rather than value-based
terms.241 The international community can either factor culture into the
anti-corruption equation or use the market to determine what constitutes
the crime of corruption.
Beyond the cultural objection, countries will also raise a sovereignty
objection to the criminalization of indigenous spoliation.242 Yet, a treaty
or customary international law would place a legal obligation upon states.
A legal obligation lessens the strength of the sovereignty objection.
Realistically, the international community needs a treaty to create a
mechanism allowing citizens to hold their public officials accountable
when domestic laws fail to give them adequate redress. If citizens seek to
hold officials accountable for indigenous spoliation in the international
realm, an international hierarchy to combat indigenous spoliation needs to
exist.
2. International Machinery and the International Criminal Court
To have an effective international mechanism for holding public officials
accountable, a three-layered hierarchy of agencies must exist to facilitate
both international and domestic anti-corruption efforts.243 The base level
would include the local enforcement in each country and international
agencies committed to fighting corruption, which would funnel informa-
tion and resources to the top of the level, the Anti-Corruption Commit-
239. See Muffler, supra note 12, at 5; Hartman, supra note 10, at 168; supra text
accompanying notes 67-68, Figure 1, Quadrant 3.
240. See supra note 181.
241. See Surjadinata, supra note 28, at 1046-47, 1052 (discussing corruption from the
standpoint of efficient and inefficient practices. The FCPA and the "western" view of
corruption tends to label corruption as evil. The author believes this view to be overin-
clusive, with the fact that some efficient practices are included in the western view of
corruption. He suggests that efficient practices should not be proscribed and that mar-
ket considerations should regulate whether activity is inefficient, i.e. corrupt. In his
final synopsis, the author condemns culturally specific legal norms and presents a mar-
ket-oriented approach to governing corrupt practices as an opportunity for wester and
developing states to converge their objectives for economic growth).
242. Developing nations object to "cultural imperialism" and value-based terms in the
criminalization process as infringing on their self-determination. Several industrialized
nations, mainly the European countries and Japan, opposed criminalization as an
option within the OECD Recommendation. See id. at 1037-39; Earle, supra note 34, at
225.
243. Figure 2 exemplifies the International Anti-Corruption Hierarchy. See infra Part
II.C.2.a.
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tee. 244 Above the base level, an Anti-Corruption Commission would hold
hearings and make recommendations as to whether an offense to go to the
highest level of the hierarchy, the International Criminal Court.
FIGURE 2
International Anti-Corruption Hierarchy
Third Level: International Criminal Court
The International
Criminal Court
Second Level: Anti-Corruption Commission
The Administrative
Agency
First Level: Anti-Corruption Committee
Funneling and OECD committees, International Financial
Consolidation Institutions, UN Committees
Regional Agencies, TI National Chapters, ICC
National Chapters
Citizen Groups, Domestic Agencies and Domestic
Regulation
a. The First Level: Funneling and Consolidation
At the base of the anti-corruption hierarchy are key institutions which can
affect internal policy changes, including: the internal governance of coun-
tries, domestic citizen groups such as TI national chapters, business
groups such as ICC national chapters, and international institutions such
as the World Bank and the United Nations. All of these groups fight cor-
ruption in different ways and with different results.245 Unfortunately, anti-
corruption is not the sole initiative of many of these groups. So, the inter-
national community needs to create an organization to consolidate anti-
corruption initiatives.
An Anti-Corruption Committee would centralize the new international
focus on corruption and consolidate current efforts. If nations create a
multilateral treaty, the Committee would ensure its operation. The organi-
244. Examples of such international agencies would be: the United Nations, OECD,
World Bank, and TI. Further, regional committees would help to funnel activities to the
next level. Even the ICC could funnel any offenses of the demand side of corruption to
the next level. A new international committee atop the base level would aid in consoli-
dating and centralizing anti-corruption efforts. See Muffler, supra note 12, at 23.
245. Governments use legislation. Citizen groups use networking and education.
The ICC uses business self-interest to call for incorporation of corporate codes of con-
duct (self-regulation) and its quasi-judicial panel to investigate violators of the Rules of
Conduct. The World Bank and IMF use policy lending and other techniques when giv-
ing aid to countries. The United Nations and OECD operate as fora for discussing cor-
ruption and produce recommendations and declarations created by working groups.
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zations at the base level would funnel information and materials to the
Committee so that the Committee becomes an information center for anti-
corruption initiatives.246
More importantly, the Anti-Corruption Committee would draft and
consolidate the anti-corruption mandates, such as regulatory norms and
the creation of integrity systems, to be accepted by the international com-
munity.247 Further, it would handle mediations and arbitrations.248 The
Committee also would recommend cases that need to move to the next level
of the hierarchy: the Anti-Corruption Commission.
b. The Second Level: The Administrative Agency
Mainly, the Anti-Corruption Commission's would hear disputes concern-
ing possible corrupt practices by domestic officials.249 As an administra-
tive agency, it allows citizens to hold domestic public officials accountable.
It will mirror the work of the ICC Standing Committee which oversees sup-
ply side violations.250 The Commission and Standing Committee could
work in conjunction to stop corruption in the international realm.
To effectively conduct its own investigations the Commission may
need the power of international discovery.251 Though international dis-
covery could be controversial, the Commission's power to punish should
not be. Such punishment would include fines and other penalties enunci-
246. Transparency International becomes a very important part of the process since
they already have the resources and disseminate information to those who ask for it. TI
is an anti-corruption grass roots organization that will play an important role in empow-
ering citizens to hold their officials accountable.
247. Such regulatory norms and anti-corruption mandates can be found within the
OECD, United Nations, and domestic laws. See generally THE TI SOURCE BooK, supra
note 148.
248. See Muffler, supra note 12, at 23 (describing how such a committee would han-
dle cases in which settlement is possible. Other cases will have to go to the Commis-
sion, where criminal penalties would be handed down).
249. See id. at 23 (presenting a treaty and machinery that would target supply side
corruption. This same machinery can work to curb demand side corruption). This
Note limits the inquiry to domestic public officials accepting bribes from MNCs, thus
implicating the international realm. Every corrupt act has some minimal international
implication, whether it be the health of a nation's economy or an MNC not getting a
contract.
250. See Vincke, supra note 4. Whereas the ICC and the business community dislike
a quasi-judicial body to hear supply side corruption claims, a Commission designed to
hear demand side corruption claims may flourish. Instead of promulgating corporate
codes of conduct in the private sector, the Commission will promote effective enforce-
ment and monitoring in the public sector.
251. See Muffler, supra note 12, at 24 (suggesting that an international discovery pro-
vision would be somewhat controversial, but is necessary. A good addition to such a
provision would be to limit assistance to the degree that national laws allow and permit
reservations to such a provision). Nations would reject an international discovery provi-
sion as an impingement on territorial sovereignty and a possible threat to national secur-
ity. One way around such objections would be to use national chapters of TI to conduct
investigations as a compromise requiring full cooperation by the allegedly corrupt
government.
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ated in local laws.2 52 More severe penalties would only come out of the
International Criminal Court, to which the Commission would send the
most reprehensible offenses. 253
c. The Third Level: International Criminal Court
OnJuly 17, 1998, the U.N. Diplomatic Conference in Rome established the
Permanent International Criminal Court.254 The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court affirms the principles of international law
recognized by the Charter of the Nfirnberg Tribunal. 255 The Court has the
power to exercise its jurisdiction over individuals who commit the most
serious crimes against the international community.25 6 The Court is the
culmination of over five decades of work to hold criminals accountable in
the international realm.25 7
The International Criminal Court sits atop the anti-corruption hierar-
chy and is the final destination of the most egregious offenders. The major
concern is whether states would become members to the Statute of the
Court, or to a new anti-corruption treaty, and accept the jurisdiction of the
court. Currently, over seventy countries have signed the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court.258 To ensure its operation within the
hierarchy of anti-corruption machinery, states party to a new anti-corrup-
252. The roadblocks of sovereignty and culture require the use of local laws at the
penalty phase of the Commission, but the International Criminal Court does not have
such a restriction. Constitutions of certain states do not allow for the high punishment
that some states would require or allow.
253. If the Anti-Corruption Commission and ICC Ad Hoc Committee work in con-
junction at this level, from both the demand and supply side of corruption, then recom-
mendations can come from both organizations to the International Criminal Court.
254. See Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome
with Decision to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, Statute of Court
Adopted by Non-Recorded Vote of 120 in Favour, 7 Against, 21 Abstentions, U.N. Depart-
ment of Public Information (July 20, 1998) (visited Mar. 3, 1999) <http://
www.wagingpeace/napf.org>.
255. Charter of the Nfirnberg Tribunal, U.N.G.A. Res. 95(1), Dec. 11, 1946.
256. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, supra note 254.
257. See ICC Timeline (visited Mar. 3, 1999) <http://gopher.igc.apc.org:70/00/icc/
news/ABCs ofICC_txt>.
258. See Rome Statute Signature and Ratification Chart, <http://www.igc.org/icc/
rome/html/ratify.html> (visited Oct. 29, 1999) (Senegal became the first country to rat-
ify the Statute of the Court in January 1999, followed by Trinidad and Tobago in April,
San Marino in May, and Italy in July. Eighty-nine countries have signed the Statute,
including: Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austra-
lia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cam-
eroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia,
Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Eritrea, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ger-
many, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan,
Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mac-
edonia (Former Yugolav Republic), Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco,
Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Portugal,
Poland, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solo-
mon Islands, South Africa, Spain, St. Lucia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Trinidad
and Tobago, Uganda, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The United
States has yet to sign the Rome Statute).
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tion treaty should be able limit their acceptance of International Criminal
Court jurisdiction to issues of indigenous spoliation.259
i. Personal Jurisdiction
The personal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court may extend
to non-signatory nationals. A State Party may refer a case to the Prosecutor
and:
the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States
are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court: (a)
The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if
the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registra-
tion of that vessel or aircraft; [or] (b) The State of which the person accused
of a crime is a national.260
Although the position of the United States is that the Court should not
exercise personal jurisdiction over non-signatory nationals, 261 there are
convincing arguments that the Court should exercise such power.
The Court exercises jurisdiction over crimes that were already in exist-
ence because of customary international law.2 62 Therefore, the interna-
tional norm that non-signatory nationals are not bound by crimes newly
created by a treaty does not apply.263 Pursuant to Article 12, the ICC may
exercise jurisdiction over a person as long as the state of the territory
where the crime was committed or the state of the national of the accused
consents.264 Article 12 permits the Court to exercise a form of limited
universal jurisdiction.
Articles 17, 89, and 90 contemplate jurisdiction over non-signatory
nationals as weU.265 These Articles flow from the preamble of the Rome
Statute which states "[riecalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise
its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes
.... "266 The Rome Statute and its "legislative history"2 67 point to allowing
259. The International Criminal Court could allow signatory nations to limit the
scope of their acceptance by setting up a special chamber to hear claims of indigenous
spoliation. See infra Part II.C.2.c.
260. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, July 17,
1998, arts. 13 and 12(2)-(3) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
261. See, e.g., DavidJ. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court,
93 A. J. Irr'L L. 12, 18 (1999).
262. See JoRDaN J. PAUST ET AL., INmERNA-IoNAL CRIMINAL LAw 74-84, 95-110 (1996).
263. See id.
264. See Rome Statute, supra note 260, art. 12.
265. See id. Article 17, which discusses inadmissibility, deals with concurrent juris-
dictional competence between the International Criminal Court and a non-signatory
state. If the non-signatory state is unwilling to investigate or prosecute, then the Interna-
tional Criminal Court may take on the case. Article 90, which discusses admissibility, is
the flip side of the same coin.
266. Id.
267. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93
AM. J. Irr'L L. 22, 26 (stating that "ft]he overwhelming majority of states.., could not
agree to requiring the consent of the state of the nationality of the accused as a prerequi-
site for the court's jurisdiction .... ").
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the Court exercise its personal jurisdiction over non-signatory nationals as
well as signatory nationals.
ii. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Court's subject matter jurisdiction over crimes of indigenous spolia-
tion comes from Article 5 of the Statute of the Court which lists the crimes
within its jurisdiction.268 Indigenous spoliation would fit into Article 7
which discusses "crimes against humanity."26 9 If persecution of citizens
by misappropriating the resources and wealth of a country can fit within
the definition of "crimes against humanity," then corruption falls within
the jurisdiction of the Court.270
Some argue that "crimes against humanity" refers only to crimes dur-
ing times of war.27 1 Yet, the language is broad, and therefore is open to a
broad reading. A better argument would state that "crimes against human-
ity" tan consist of crimes during both war times and peace times. 2 72 In
times of peace, the deprivation of the power of the people to efficiently
dispose of their resources should constitute a "crime against humanity. '273
The Rome Statute also requires "crimes against humanity" to be systematic,
intended, and done by the state,2 74 each of which fall into the definition of
indigenous spoliation.2 75 Critics further will argue that the inclusion of
indigenous spoliation will trivialize the other crimes historically
included.2 76  Therefore, the International Criminal Court could
subordinate indigenous spoliation claims by creating a panel dealing with
indigenous spoliation or, after much deliberation, decide that indigenous
spoliation is worthy of adjudication by the International Criminal Court.
268. The Court has jurisdiction over (1) the crime of genocide; (2) crimes against
humanity; (3) war crimes; and (4) crimes of aggression. See Rome Statute, supra note
260.
269. Id. art. 7, paragraph 1(h)( "Persecution against any identifiable group or collec-
tivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in para-
graph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court").
270. Some discussion regarding corruption as a "crime against humanity" has
occurred within the United Nations. See Corruption in Government, supra note 224, at
24.
271. Such as the raping and murdering of the enemies' women and children upon the
capture of a city. Violations of international humanitarian law were found to be a threat
to international peace and security in the War Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia. See
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. SC/RES/1993/827.
272. See STEvEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, AccouNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATRocrnEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAw: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 45-77 (1997) (stating
that although the nexus to armed conflict remained in the charter of the Yugoslavia
Tribunal, it did not remain in the charter of the Rwanda Tribunal. The authors further
discuss the fact that international criminal scholars and bureaucrats presume that
crimes against humanity can occur in times of peace. The nexus to armed conflict is
also absent from the ILC's 1996 Draft Code.).
273. See Corruption in Government, supra note 224, at 24 (discussing the description
of corruption as a "crime against humanity").
274. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 272, at 57-67.
275. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 218-26, and accompanying text.
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Assuming indigenous spoliation falls within the jurisdiction of the
Court, the Court could play a significant role in the anti-corruption hierar-
chy. The Court could take referrals from the Anti-Corruption Commis-
sion.27 7 If the Court decides to create a special chamber, it could
overcome objections raised against including indigenous spoliation as a
"crime against humanity."278 The Court stands as powerful weapon
against corruption in the international realm.27 9
Another answer to the criticisms of an International Anti-Corruption
Hierarchy would be to create domestic investigatory commissions. The
International Anti-Corruption Hierarchy does not contemplate the creation
of domestic investigatory commissions, also known as "truth commis-
sions." Nations have used "truth commissions" in instances of human
rights abuses.2 80 Governments may establish "truth commissions" in
order to hold public officials accountable for indigenous spoliation. An
investigatory commission may build a solid domestic foundation for anti-
corruption efforts for several reasons:
First .... an effective panel can establish an official, authoritative record of
abuses in a country, thereby helping to educate the public, possibly deter
future abuses, and strengthen the rule of law .... Secondly .... [a truth
commission] helps impart to the citizenry a sense of dignity and empower-
ment that can help them move beyond the pain of the past.... Thirdly, a
commission can promote justice by imposing moral condemnation and pos-
sibly laying the groundwork for other sanctions, especially if it assigns
responsibility for abuses. Fourthly, it can demonstrate that human rights
are a priority for a successor government and further discredit the perpetra-
tors of abuses. Fifthly, . . . an investigatory panel can more readily go
beyond [judicial] confines to explore the historical and political context of
the abuses and make recommendations to deal with past abuses and prevent
future ones.28 1
Such investigatory bodies can be suggested and constructed with the aid of
NGOs and international policy initiatives.
277. See Rome Statute, supra note 260 (Article 14 allows states parties to make refer-
rals about situations they feel to be criminal. Extending the referral ability to the Anti-
Corruption Commission would not be too much of a stretch and may increase the effi-
ciency of the New International Focus on Corruption. Articles 15 and 42 introduce the
office of the Prosecutor of the Court. The Prosecutor can take referrals, conduct investi-
gations, and prosecute individuals charged with crimes. The work of the Anti-Corrup-
tion Commission could create more efficiency for corruption charges in the office of the
Prosecutor by doing investigations and pre-trial work before the trial stage).
278. See id. at Part 4: Composition and Administration of Court: Article 39: Cham-
bers (The Statute divides the Court into Pre-Trial, Trial, and Appellate Chambers. Spe-
cialized chambers would give the Court more depth in its proceedings).
279. The Rome Statute is being held open for signatories until December 31, 2000.
280. See RATNER & ABRAMs, supra note 272, at 193 (stating that "[c]ommissions are
usually created at a transition point 'to demonstrate or underscore a break with a past
record of human rights abuses, to promote national reconciliation, and/or to obtain or
sustain political legitimacy'" (citing Priscilla Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974
to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HuM. RTs. Q. 597, 604 (1994)).
281. RATNER & ABRAMs, supra note 272, at 202-03. Most powerfully, truth commis-
sions also allow corruption investigations to be handled domestically.
203
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All these legal initiatives may be for naught if countries do not achieve
success in more basic, internal foundational reforms. Such internal
reforms 282 would be mostly economic in nature, aimed to eliminate gov-
ernment monopoly power and discretion of government officials. 28 3 Inter-
national policy initiatives would- include contractual provisions by
international financial institutions as well as educational programs by TI.
Policy initiatives will not only strengthen domestic institutions, but also
will aid in the international struggle against corruption.
D. Policy Initiatives
Criminalizing indigenous spoliation and providing an international legal
mechanism for holding public officials accountable would empower citi-
zens to fight corruption. Even with these powerful international tools,
local governments and citizen groups need to act as catalysts for internal
policy changes. International policy initiatives should target government
monopoly power and the discretion of public officials. This section
explores the role of international financial institutions and Transparency
International in affecting internal policy changes. First, this section dis-
cusses how international financial institutions aid nations through policy
lending and creation of Integrated Financial Management Systems. Then,
it examines how TI raises public awareness and strengthens the political
will of citizens through educational programs. .Finally, this section con-
cludes that international financial institutions and TI can aid countries in
building the proper foundation on which further anti-corruption strategies
can be built.
1. The Role of International Financial Institutions
International financial institutions facilitate anti-corruption efforts by lim-
iting the role of the government in the economic realm. 28 4 Through their
lending programs, international financial institutions attack the monopoly
power of bureaucracies in the economic field by introducing financial man-
agement systems and attaching required accounting and auditing proce-
dures to loans.2 85 They dismantle administrative corruption by inhibiting
the discretion public officials have in government contracts by requiring
282. See supra notes 151-66 and accompanying text.
283. See id.
284. IFIs, such as the IMF and World Bank, can increase their lending to countries
that are not corrupt or show a decrease in corrupt activities. See Boswell, supra note 3,
at 1173. These external funding agencies care how their money is spent and what effect
they are having on developing nations. See Earle, supra note 34, at 234.
285. "An experienced World Bank official mentioned that complaints about inappro-
priate capital-labor ratios in evaluation reports were often a way of flagging corrupt
deals." Rose-Ackerman, supra note 21, at 42; see also THE TI SOURCE BOOK, supra note
148, 116-23 (suggesting the use of Integrated Financial Management Systems (IFMS)
which have been used by IFIs for projects in Bolivia, Argentina, Guatemala, Honduras,
Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, El Salvador, panama and the Dominican
Republic. Such an IFMS would aid anti-corruption efforts by controlling budgetary con-
cerns at several levels; avoiding cash flow crises; spotlighting weaknesses in public sec-
tor management; internally validating integrity; allowing accounting control over
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transparency throughout the period of government contract bidding, pay-
ment, and performance. 28 6 International financial institutions aid anti-
corruption supporters by bringing about fundamental reform. 28 7
The main vehicles through which international lending institutions
can aid countries in their fight against corruption are policy lending and
technical assistance loans.28 8 They also can lend aid through seminars,
research, and grants,289 as well as creating private, contractual rights and
duties in their lending instruments.290 Through these methods, lending
institutions cultivate efficiency, transparency, and open markets.291
In addition to policy lending, the World Bank provides technical and
sectoral investment loans to allow reform in corrupt activities by providing
the technology necessary for best accounting, budgeting, cash manage-
ment, and credit management techniques.292 Through the Institutional
Development Fund, the World Bank gives grants to countries for capacity
building for purposes of introducing new legislation, procurement training,
and studies to diagnose civil and legal problems. 293 The World Bank also
resources; allowing transparency in public reporting; consistently enforcing anti-corrup-
tion criteria; and decentralizing authority and accountability).
286. See THE TI SOURCE BOOK, supra note 148, at 121 (describing how good financial
management counteracts corruption by imposing market discipline upon public offi-
cials; strengthening the probability of detection; creating a disadvantage for the corrupt;
protecting highly vulnerable areas from corruption; permitting proper management and
oversight; facilitating auditing procedures; and providing psychological control);
Kimberly Ann Elliott, Corruption as an International Policy Problem: Overview and Rec-
ommendations, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 222-23 (Kimberly Ann Elliott
ed., 1997) (noting that the World Bank emphasizes transparency at all phases of the
bidding process).
287. See THE TI SOURCE BOOK, supra note 148, at 120-121; Elliott, supra note 285, at
222-23 (suggesting that the World Bank's largest contributions come through capacity
building and promotion of institutional reforms).
288. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 482-83.
289. See id.
290. International financial institutions play a pivotal role in shaping the mentality
against corruption by implementing "no bribes" clauses in development contracts which
create personal guarantees based upon reputation. In many countries, to lose face is a
great sacrifice. Therefore, citizens avoid it at all cost. If taking a bribe causes one to lose
face, then no matter how deeply rooted gift-giving and loyalty are, anti-corruption efforts
will have an effect. See Surjadinata, supra note 28, at 1040. Taking a bribe would also
lead to a private cause of action for breach of contract. With millions of dollars on the
line, a breach of contract claim may be substantial.
291. Policy lending, initiated in 1980 to help countries improve their economic per-
formance, includes structural and sectoral loans including general measures of deregula-
tion, liberalization, and privatization; which aim to replace administrative constraints
with market mechanisms. See id. at 482 (specific measures include: (1) banking laws
and regulations to ensure health of financial sector; (2) tax laws and regulations to
improve tax administration; (3) procurement laws and regulations for development
products, including accounting and auditing systems; (4) legal and judicial reform; and
(5) civil service reform); The Social Impact of Adjustment Operations: An Overview
(World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, Report No. 14776, 1995).
292. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 482; Structural and Sectoral Adjustment: World
Bank Experience 1980-1992 (World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, Report
No. 14691, 1995); THE TI SOURCE BOOK, supra note 148, at 119-20.
293. See Shihata, supra note 14, at 483 (the price of grants to developing countries is
reform rather than return of payment).
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offers seminars through the Economic Development Institute and conducts
research on corruption in various countries. 294 Beyond education, the
World Bank has issued anti-corruption guidelines which provide that
"upon discovery of fraudulent or corrupt conduct by a bidder or borrower,
the bank will reject the bidder's proposal for awards, cancel the remaining
portion of loans, and debar the lawyers from future World Bank financing
for a stated period of time or indefinitely."295 The World Bank takes an
active role in fighting corruption and allowing countries to fight
corruption.
The IMF likewise has taken the lead in advancing a Code of Good
Practices on Fiscal Transparency - Declaration on Principles.296 The IMF
based its Code on four principles:
roles and responsibilities in government should be clear; information on
government activities should be provided to the public; budget preparation,
execution and reporting should be undertaken in an open manner; and fis-
cal information should be subjected to independent assurances of
integrity.297
The IMF and its control of monetary assistance ensure the implementation
of the Code by member countries.298 "The Code will facilitate surveillance
of economic policies by country authorities, financial markets, and inter-
national institutions."299
Rather than empowering citizens to hold officials accountable, inter-
national financial institutions limit the role of the government in the eco-
nomic sector and decrease the discretion of public officials by
implementing Integrated Financial Management Systems, which allow for
better accounting, auditing, budgeting, and cash and credit manage-
ment.300 "Because these institutions often play a key role in major infra-
structure projects, their posture can influence the course of key economic
activities of governments and private parties around the world."'301
294. See id.
295. Lucinda A. Low & Kathryn Cameron Atkinson, Led by the U.S., the World Wages
War on Corruption, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 3, 1997, at B15.
296. See Communique of the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1998/PR9814.HTM>
(visited Oct. 29, 1999).
297. Id.
298. For example, the IMF agreed to lend billions of dollars to Indonesia only if the
youngest son of former President Suharto gave up his monopoly in the production of
cloves in which he received tax breaks and concessions. The agreement further led to
close friends of Suharto losing cartels in other distribution avenues. See Seth Mydans,
Suharto Agrees to End Monopolies: IMF Deal Would Dismantle Cartel of Family and
Friends, Irr'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 16, 1998, at 1.
299. Id.
300. See THE TI SOURCE BooK, supra note 148, at 119-20.
301. Lucinda A. Low, Transnational Corruption: New Rules for Old Temptations, New
Players to Combat a Perennial Evil, 92 Am. Soc'Y INT'L PROC. 151, 156 (1998) (suggesting
that IFIs have a "multiplier effect that goes beyond their actual economic
contributions").
Vol. 33
2000 A Strategy to Combat Corruption
Empowering citizens and rallying international public opinion is the spe-
cialty of another NGO: Transparency International.302
2. The Role of the World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization (WTO), predecessor to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has been advocating stricter govern-
ment procurement practices in order to combat corruption.30 3 The WTO's
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) entered into force on January
1, 1996.304
The GPA was both voluntary and required changes in domestic law
regarding bidding and procurement procedures.30 5 Many countries did
not adopt the GPA, but the GPA was only the first step in the WTO's war
against corruption.
The WTO's next step was to create a working group to study trans-
parency in government procurement practices.30 6 The goal of the working
group is to "develop elements of a future agreement on transparency." 30 7
Such an agreement would require the 132 members of the WTO to come in
line with the new transparency procedures. Further, the WTO has a dis-
pute resolution mechanism through which members can enforce compli-
ance with the transparency features. 308 The WTO will play a major role in
combating corruption by creating bind agreements and allowing members
to ensure each other's compliance.
3. The Role of Transparency International
On September 22, 1998, Transparency International released its 1998 Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index (CPI), a poll drawing upon several surveys of
business and public views of the extent of corruption in eighty-five coun-
tries around the world.30 9 Dr. Peter Eigen, Chairman of TI, called the 1998
302. See Earle, supra note 34, at 232 (the mission of TI is to "curb corrup-
tion . . .establish and implement effective laws, policies, and anti-corruption pro-
grams... strengthen public support and understanding for anti-corruption programs
and enhance public transparency and accountability in international business transac-
tions and in the administration of public procurement"); Valeria Merino Dirani, Building
Islands of Integrity - The Ecuador Model After One Year, TI NEwSL., Mar. 1995, at 3-4.
303. Barbara Crutchfield George et al., On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global
Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts
Toward the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 V~AD. J. TsANSNAT'L L. 1, 40 (1999).
304. SeeJulie B. Nesbit, Transnational Bribery of Foreign Officials: A New Threat to the
Future of Democracy, 31 VANm. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1273, 1297-98 (1998).
305. See id. at 1298.
306. See WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Dec. 13, 1996, art. 21, reprinted in
36 I.L.M. 218, 226 (1997); George, supra note 303, at 41 (stating that at the Singapore
summit, "the United States altered the perception of business corruption from a moral
concern to an international trade concern," thus garnering support for a future agree-
ment on transparency.
307. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 306, at 226.
308. See Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning the
Limits of the World Trade Organization's Authority, 28 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 711, 715
(1996).
309. See Transparency International (TI) 1998 Corruption Perceptions Index, Press
Release, Sept. 22, 1998.
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CPI a "wake-up call to political leaders and to the public at large to con-
front the abundant corruption that pervades so many countries." 3 10
The CPI and the use of international media exemplifies what TI does
for anti-corruption efforts. Not only does TI call the attention of the world
to the problem of corruption, but also compiles data to prove its points. 3 11
Additionally, TI effectively rallies international public opinion to the cause
of anti-corruption. 31 2
TI has a far greater role than just rallying public opinion and raising
awareness. Through its seventy national chapters, TI can disseminate
information and foster educational programs about the damage corruption
causes. 3 13 Through educational programs, TI can develop a generation of
citizens who will hold their public officials accountable. 3 14
Transparency International also answers the concern of those corpora-
tions brave enough to fight corruption. TI designed the Transparency
International Integrity Pact (Pact):
(1) to enable companies to abstain from bribery by providing assurances to
them that (i) their competitors will also refrain from bribery and (ii) govern-
ment procurement agencies will undertake to prevent any form of corrup-
tion, including extortion, and will follow transparent procedures; and (2) to
enable governments to reduce the high cost and the distorting impact of
corruption on public procurement. 3 15
The Pact would require a commitment, personally signed by a company
CEO, by a potential bidder to not offer or pay any bribes in connection
with the government contract. 316 Furthermore, the government would
make the same commitment against bribery.317 "In essence, these commit-
ments are nothing other than a commitment to respect and invoke the
existing laws of the country."3 18
Within an anti-corruption framework, TI can inform the populace
about the international hierarchy citizens may use to hold public officials
internationally accountable. It can educate as to limiting the role of the
310. Id.
311. See generally THE TI SOURCE BOOK, supra note 148.
312. For example, after completion of the OECD convention, Peter Eigen stated, "[w]e
are determined to closely monitor how the convention becomes a legal reality and we are
certainly ready to cry foul when countries fail to meet their commitments." Peter Eigen,
The OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, 45 FED. LAw. 22, 23 (Aug. 1998).
313. See id. at 1.
314. The damages to third world economies . . . goes beyond the fact that the
wrong supplier or contractor might be chosen. When a government is per-
suaded, that is bribed, that it needs aircraft or a food processing plant which is
unnecessary or unjustified, not only is there a loss of scarce foreign exchange
resources, but also those resources have been deprived from worthwhile
projects.
Michael Holman, New Group Targets the Roots of Corruption, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 1993, at
4; see also THE TI SOURCE BOOK, supra note 148, at 35.
315. Eigen, supra note 312, at 23.
316. See id.
317. See id.
318. See id.
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state in the economy and the need to build a strong private sector. Where
appropriate, TI can educate as to the need for cultural reform. It has the
power to affect internal change and basic reform through its grass roots
movements.
No matter how effective the machinery one builds, without the proper
foundation and support it will most certainly collapse. International
financial institutions and Transparency International foster basic reform at
the domestic level. They foster liberalization, deregulation, privatization,
and education. They rally international public opinion to the support of
anti-corruption initiatives. They provide hope.
Conclusion: A Complex Strategy for a Complex Problem
The solutions offered above are an attempt to solve a complex problem
with a multi-layered strategy. Such a strategy must start at a basic level and
gradually increase in complexity. Even though international corruption is
multifarious, its solution commences very simply: people must realize that
corruption harms every country. The cure for corruption begins at the
domestic level. The people of every country must stop accepting the cor-
rupt behavior of their leaders. People, however, do not have the political
will nor the knowledge of how to stop corruption. The goal of the solu-
tions above is to empower people to no longer accept corrupt practices and
to hold corrupt officials accountable.
International initiatives which target the demand side of corruption
would give citizens an avenue for holding public officials accountable in
the international realm. The legal and policy initiatives create disincentives
to be corrupt, and incentives to combat corruption. International financial
institutions and Transparency International help educate the people to
develop their own country's internal reform and stop accepting corrupt
behavior. Such internal reforms will establish a foundation upon which
further anti-corruption efforts can be built. A treaty criminalizing indige-
nous spoliation deters corrupt activity and bolsters domestic support in
fighting corruption. An International Anti-Corruption Hierarchy engen-
ders political will to fight corruption and to bring corrupt officials to jus-
tice. These efforts enable citizens to have the political will to achieve
success in fighting against corruption. They give us hope that as we enter
the twenty-first century, Judge Noonan's prophecy will come true: corrup-
tion will be as obsolete as slavery.

